Docker-based Jellyfin media server with UCI config (port, image, media paths, GPU transcoding), procd init, jellyfinctl CLI, and LuCI frontend with status/config/logs view. Also adds Punk Exposure Engine architectural README documenting the Peek/Poke/Emancipate service exposure model and DNS provider API roadmap. CLAUDE.md updated with architectural directive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
213 lines
9.8 KiB
Markdown
213 lines
9.8 KiB
Markdown
# Claude Instructions for SecuBox OpenWrt
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## OpenWrt Shell Scripting Guidelines
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### Process Detection
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- **Use `pgrep crowdsec` instead of `pgrep -x crowdsec`**
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- The `-x` flag requires an exact process name match which doesn't work reliably on OpenWrt/BusyBox
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- Same applies to other daemons: use `pgrep <name>` without `-x`
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### Command Availability
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- `timeout` command is NOT available on OpenWrt by default - use alternatives or check with `command -v timeout`
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- `ss` command may not be available - use `netstat` or `/proc/net/tcp` as fallbacks
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- `sqlite3` may not be installed - provide fallback methods (e.g., delete database file instead of running SQL)
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### JSON Parsing
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- **Use `jsonfilter` instead of `jq`** - jsonfilter is native to OpenWrt (part of libubox), jq is often not installed
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- Syntax examples:
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```bash
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# Get a field value
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jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@.field_name'
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# Get nested field
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jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@.parent.child'
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# Get array length (count elements)
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jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@[*]' | wc -l
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# Get array element
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jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@[0]'
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```
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- Always check for empty results: `[ -z "$result" ] && result=0`
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### Port Detection
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When checking if a port is listening, use this order of fallbacks:
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1. `/proc/net/tcp` (always available) - ports are in hex (e.g., 8080 = 1F90)
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2. `netstat -tln` (usually available)
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3. `ss -tln` (may not be available)
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### Logging
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- OpenWrt uses `logread` instead of traditional log files
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- Use `logread -l N` to get last N lines
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- CrowdSec writes to `/var/log/crowdsec.log`
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## Build & Sync Workflow
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### CRITICAL: Sync Local Feed Before Building
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- **ALWAYS sync the local-feed before building packages from edited source trees**
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- The build system uses `secubox-tools/local-feed/` NOT `package/secubox/` directly
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- If you edit files in `package/secubox/<pkg>/`, those changes won't be built unless synced
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**Before building after edits:**
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```bash
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# Option 1: Sync specific package to local-feed
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rsync -av --delete package/secubox/<package-name>/ secubox-tools/local-feed/<package-name>/
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# Option 2: Sync all SecuBox packages
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for pkg in package/secubox/*/; do
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name=$(basename "$pkg")
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rsync -av --delete "$pkg" "secubox-tools/local-feed/$name/"
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done
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# Then build
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./secubox-tools/local-build.sh build <package-name>
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```
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**Quick deploy without rebuild (for RPCD/shell scripts):**
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```bash
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# Copy script directly to router for testing
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scp package/secubox/<pkg>/root/usr/libexec/rpcd/<script> root@192.168.255.1:/usr/libexec/rpcd/
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ssh root@192.168.255.1 '/etc/init.d/rpcd restart'
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```
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### Local Feeds Hygiene
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- Clean and resync local feeds before build iterations when dependency drift is suspected
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- Prefer the repo helpers; avoid ad-hoc `rm` unless explicitly needed
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### Local Build Flow
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- Use `./secubox-tools/local-build.sh build <module>` for cached SDK builds
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- If CI parity is required, use `make package/<module>/compile V=s`
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### Sync Build Artifacts
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- After building, synchronize results into the build output folder used by local-build.sh
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- Use the repo sync helper scripts where available to avoid missing `root/` vs `htdocs/` payloads
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### Toolchain Usage
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- **CRITICAL: Non-LuCI SecuBox apps MUST be built with the full OpenWrt toolchain, NOT the SDK**
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- Go packages (crowdsec, crowdsec-firewall-bouncer) require the full toolchain due to CGO and ARM64 compatibility
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- Native C/C++ binaries (netifyd, nodogsplash) require the full toolchain
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- The SDK produces binaries with LSE atomic instructions that crash on some ARM64 CPUs (like MochaBin's Cortex-A72)
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- Packages requiring full toolchain build (in `secubox-tools/openwrt`):
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- `crowdsec` - Go binary with CGO
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- `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer` - Go binary with CGO
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- `netifyd` - C++ native binary
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- `nodogsplash` - C native binary
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- To build with full toolchain:
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```bash
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cd secubox-tools/openwrt
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make package/<package-name>/compile V=s
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```
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- LuCI apps and pure shell/Lua packages can use the SDK:
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```bash
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cd secubox-tools/sdk
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make package/<package-name>/compile V=s
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# Or use local-build.sh for LuCI apps
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```
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- If unsure, check `OPENWRT_ONLY_PACKAGES` in `secubox-tools/local-build.sh`
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## RPCD Backend Scripting (Shell-based RPC handlers)
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### jshn Argument Size Limits
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- **`json_add_string` cannot handle large values** (e.g., base64-encoded images/SVGs)
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- jshn passes values as shell arguments, which hit BusyBox's argument size limit ("Argument list too long")
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- **Workaround**: Build JSON output manually via file I/O instead of jshn:
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```sh
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local tmpfile="/tmp/wg_output_$$.json"
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printf '{"field":"' > "$tmpfile"
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# Stream large data via pipe/redirect (never as argument)
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some_command | base64 -w 0 >> "$tmpfile"
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printf '"}\n' >> "$tmpfile"
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cat "$tmpfile"
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rm -f "$tmpfile"
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```
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- This applies to any RPCD method that returns large blobs (QR codes, certificates, etc.)
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### UCI Private Data Storage
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- Use underscore-prefixed option names for internal/hidden data: `uci set network.section._private_field="value"`
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- These are not shown in standard LuCI forms but are accessible via `uci -q get`
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- Useful for storing client private keys, internal state, etc.
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## LuCI JavaScript Frontend
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### RPC `expect` Field Behavior
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- **`rpc.declare({ expect: { field: '' } })` unwraps the response** — it returns ONLY the value of `field`, not the full object
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- If the backend returns `{"config": "...", "error": "..."}` and expect is `{ config: '' }`, the result is just the config string — `result.error` is undefined
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- **Use `expect: { }` (empty object) when you need the full response** including error fields
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- Use `expect: { field: default }` only when you always want just that one field and don't need error handling
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### Module Caching
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- **LuCI's JS module loader caches parsed modules in memory** — `Ctrl+Shift+R` does NOT clear this
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- Clearing browser cache, `rm /tmp/luci-indexcache*`, and `rm /tmp/luci-modulecache/*` may not be enough
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- **Reliable fix**: Force full page navigation with cache-busting query param:
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```js
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window.location.href = window.location.pathname + '?' + Date.now();
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```
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- For development, set `uci set uhttpd.main.no_cache=1 && uci commit uhttpd && /etc/init.d/uhttpd restart`
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### Quick Deploy for LuCI JS/RPCD Changes
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- LuCI JS views and shared resources can be deployed directly to the router without rebuilding:
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```bash
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# Deploy JS views
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scp htdocs/luci-static/resources/view/<app>/*.js root@192.168.255.1:/www/luci-static/resources/view/<app>/
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# Deploy shared JS libraries
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scp htdocs/luci-static/resources/<app>/*.js root@192.168.255.1:/www/luci-static/resources/<app>/
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# Deploy RPCD handler and restart
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scp root/usr/libexec/rpcd/<handler> root@192.168.255.1:/usr/libexec/rpcd/
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ssh root@192.168.255.1 '/etc/init.d/rpcd restart'
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# Clear LuCI caches on router
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ssh root@192.168.255.1 'rm -f /tmp/luci-indexcache* /tmp/luci-modulecache/*'
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```
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### Common Pitfalls
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- **RPC params order matters**: The `params` array in `rpc.declare()` must match the positional arguments in `addPeer(arg1, arg2, ...)` calls — adding a new param means updating ALL callers
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- **sessionStorage is volatile**: Data stored in `sessionStorage` is lost on tab close/refresh — don't rely on it for persistent data; use UCI backend storage instead
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- **Interface name conflicts**: When creating WireGuard interfaces, always check for existing names (wg0, wg1, etc.) and auto-increment to the next available name
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## Punk Exposure Engine — Architectural Directive
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The SecuBox service exposure architecture follows a three-verb model called **Peek / Poke / Emancipate**. All new service components, exposure features, and mesh integrations must align with this model.
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### Core Concepts
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- **Peek**: Discover and scan. Any feature that detects services, lists DNS records, shows mesh peers, or aggregates visibility across nodes.
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- **Poke**: Target and configure. Any feature that selects a service and configures an exposure channel (Tor, DNS/SSL, mesh publish).
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- **Emancipate**: Activate the linking flow. Any feature that atomically makes a service reachable through one or more channels.
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### Three Exposure Channels
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1. **Tor** — `.onion` hidden services via `secubox-app-tor` + `secubox-exposure tor add`
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2. **DNS/SSL** — Classical HTTPS via HAProxy + ACME + DNS provider API (OVH, Gandi, Cloudflare) via `secubox-app-dns-provider` + `dnsctl`
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3. **Mesh** — P2P service registry via `secubox-p2p publish` + gossip chain sync
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### Key Architectural Rules
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- **Match services by port, not name** — when cross-referencing scan results with Tor/SSL/vhost/mesh entries, always use the backend port number as the join key
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- **DNS provider API integration** — use `dnsctl` (from `secubox-app-dns-provider`) for programmatic DNS record management; support DNS-01 ACME challenges as alternative to HTTP-01 webroot
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- **Emancipate is multi-channel** — exposing a service should support activating Tor + DNS + Mesh in a single flow; each channel is independently togglable
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- **Every station is generative** — each SecuBox node can discover local services, create new exposure endpoints, and propagate them to mesh peers
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- **Guard against local-only exposure** — never auto-expose services bound to 127.0.0.1; only services on 0.0.0.0 or specific LAN IPs are eligible for external exposure
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### Reference Document
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Full architectural spec: `package/secubox/PUNK-EXPOSURE.md`
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### Affected Packages
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| Package | Role in Punk Exposure |
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| `secubox-app-exposure` | Peek scanner + Tor/SSL orchestrator |
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| `luci-app-exposure` | Dashboard: Peek table + Poke toggles |
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| `secubox-app-tor` | Tor channel backend |
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| `secubox-app-haproxy` | SSL/ACME channel backend |
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| `secubox-app-dns-provider` | DNS provider API (to build) |
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| `secubox-p2p` | Mesh channel + gossip sync |
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| `secubox-master-link` | Node onboarding + trust hierarchy |
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| `luci-app-service-registry` | Aggregated service catalog + health checks |
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