- Add Emancipate button to dashboard sites table - Implement async RPC with job polling to avoid XHR timeout - Add emancipate + emancipate_status RPCD methods - Add ACL permissions for new RPC methods - Change HAProxy reload to restart for clean state - Document RPCD ACL requirements in CLAUDE.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Claude Instructions for SecuBox OpenWrt
Session Startup — Follow the Roadmap
Before starting any work, always read the project planning files to understand current priorities and context:
.claude/TODO.md— Open tasks and backlog, ordered by priority.claude/WIP.md— Active threads, next-up items, and blockers.claude/HISTORY.md— Completed milestones with dates (gap analysis reference).claude/context.md— Module map, stack overview, and templatespackage/secubox/PUNK-EXPOSURE.md— Architectural spec for exposure features.claude/FAQ-TROUBLESHOOTING.md— Consult before debugging — resolved issues and known fixes for LXC cgroups, networking, HAProxy, mitmproxy, DNS
When the user says "continue" or "next", consult WIP.md "Next Up" and TODO.md "Open" to pick the next task. When completing work, update these files to keep them current. New features and fixes must be appended to HISTORY.md with the date.
OpenWrt Shell Scripting Guidelines
Process Detection
- Use
pgrep crowdsecinstead ofpgrep -x crowdsec- The
-xflag requires an exact process name match which doesn't work reliably on OpenWrt/BusyBox - Same applies to other daemons: use
pgrep <name>without-x
- The
Command Availability
timeoutcommand is NOT available on OpenWrt by default - use alternatives or check withcommand -v timeoutsscommand may not be available - usenetstator/proc/net/tcpas fallbackssqlite3may not be installed - provide fallback methods (e.g., delete database file instead of running SQL)
JSON Parsing
- Use
jsonfilterinstead ofjq- jsonfilter is native to OpenWrt (part of libubox), jq is often not installed - Syntax examples:
# Get a field value jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@.field_name' # Get nested field jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@.parent.child' # Get array length (count elements) jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@[*]' | wc -l # Get array element jsonfilter -i /path/to/file.json -e '@[0]' - Always check for empty results:
[ -z "$result" ] && result=0
Port Detection
When checking if a port is listening, use this order of fallbacks:
/proc/net/tcp(always available) - ports are in hex (e.g., 8080 = 1F90)netstat -tln(usually available)ss -tln(may not be available)
Logging
- OpenWrt uses
logreadinstead of traditional log files - Use
logread -l Nto get last N lines - CrowdSec writes to
/var/log/crowdsec.log
Build & Sync Workflow
CRITICAL: Sync Local Feed Before Building
- ALWAYS sync the local-feed before building packages from edited source trees
- The build system uses
secubox-tools/local-feed/NOTpackage/secubox/directly - If you edit files in
package/secubox/<pkg>/, those changes won't be built unless synced
Before building after edits:
# Option 1: Sync specific package to local-feed
rsync -av --delete package/secubox/<package-name>/ secubox-tools/local-feed/<package-name>/
# Option 2: Sync all SecuBox packages
for pkg in package/secubox/*/; do
name=$(basename "$pkg")
rsync -av --delete "$pkg" "secubox-tools/local-feed/$name/"
done
# Then build
./secubox-tools/local-build.sh build <package-name>
Quick deploy without rebuild (for RPCD/shell scripts):
# Copy script directly to router for testing
scp package/secubox/<pkg>/root/usr/libexec/rpcd/<script> root@192.168.255.1:/usr/libexec/rpcd/
ssh root@192.168.255.1 '/etc/init.d/rpcd restart'
Local Feeds Hygiene
- Clean and resync local feeds before build iterations when dependency drift is suspected
- Prefer the repo helpers; avoid ad-hoc
rmunless explicitly needed
Local Build Flow
- Use
./secubox-tools/local-build.sh build <module>for cached SDK builds - If CI parity is required, use
make package/<module>/compile V=s
Sync Build Artifacts
- After building, synchronize results into the build output folder used by local-build.sh
- Use the repo sync helper scripts where available to avoid missing
root/vshtdocs/payloads
Toolchain Usage
-
CRITICAL: Non-LuCI SecuBox apps MUST be built with the full OpenWrt toolchain, NOT the SDK
- Go packages (crowdsec, crowdsec-firewall-bouncer) require the full toolchain due to CGO and ARM64 compatibility
- Native C/C++ binaries (netifyd, nodogsplash) require the full toolchain
- The SDK produces binaries with LSE atomic instructions that crash on some ARM64 CPUs (like MochaBin's Cortex-A72)
-
Packages requiring full toolchain build (in
secubox-tools/openwrt):crowdsec- Go binary with CGOcrowdsec-firewall-bouncer- Go binary with CGOnetifyd- C++ native binarynodogsplash- C native binary
-
To build with full toolchain:
cd secubox-tools/openwrt make package/<package-name>/compile V=s -
LuCI apps and pure shell/Lua packages can use the SDK:
cd secubox-tools/sdk make package/<package-name>/compile V=s # Or use local-build.sh for LuCI apps -
If unsure, check
OPENWRT_ONLY_PACKAGESinsecubox-tools/local-build.sh
RPCD Backend Scripting (Shell-based RPC handlers)
jshn Argument Size Limits
json_add_stringcannot handle large values (e.g., base64-encoded images/SVGs)- jshn passes values as shell arguments, which hit BusyBox's argument size limit ("Argument list too long")
- Workaround: Build JSON output manually via file I/O instead of jshn:
local tmpfile="/tmp/wg_output_$$.json" printf '{"field":"' > "$tmpfile" # Stream large data via pipe/redirect (never as argument) some_command | base64 -w 0 >> "$tmpfile" printf '"}\n' >> "$tmpfile" cat "$tmpfile" rm -f "$tmpfile" - This applies to any RPCD method that returns large blobs (QR codes, certificates, etc.)
UCI Private Data Storage
- Use underscore-prefixed option names for internal/hidden data:
uci set network.section._private_field="value" - These are not shown in standard LuCI forms but are accessible via
uci -q get - Useful for storing client private keys, internal state, etc.
ACL Permissions for New RPC Methods
- CRITICAL: When adding a new RPCD method, you MUST also add it to the ACL file
- Without ACL entry, LuCI will return
-32002: Access deniederror - ACL files are located at:
root/usr/share/rpcd/acl.d/<app>.json - Add read-only methods to the
"read"section, write/action methods to the"write"section:{ "luci-app-example": { "read": { "ubus": { "luci.example": ["status", "list", "get_info"] } }, "write": { "ubus": { "luci.example": ["create", "delete", "update", "action_method"] } } } } - After deploying ACL changes, restart rpcd AND have user re-login to LuCI:
scp root/usr/share/rpcd/acl.d/<app>.json root@192.168.255.1:/usr/share/rpcd/acl.d/ ssh root@192.168.255.1 '/etc/init.d/rpcd restart' - User must log out and log back into LuCI to get new permissions
LuCI JavaScript Frontend
RPC expect Field Behavior
rpc.declare({ expect: { field: '' } })unwraps the response — it returns ONLY the value offield, not the full object- If the backend returns
{"config": "...", "error": "..."}and expect is{ config: '' }, the result is just the config string —result.erroris undefined - Use
expect: { }(empty object) when you need the full response including error fields - Use
expect: { field: default }only when you always want just that one field and don't need error handling
Module Caching
- LuCI's JS module loader caches parsed modules in memory —
Ctrl+Shift+Rdoes NOT clear this - Clearing browser cache,
rm /tmp/luci-indexcache*, andrm /tmp/luci-modulecache/*may not be enough - Reliable fix: Force full page navigation with cache-busting query param:
window.location.href = window.location.pathname + '?' + Date.now(); - For development, set
uci set uhttpd.main.no_cache=1 && uci commit uhttpd && /etc/init.d/uhttpd restart
Quick Deploy for LuCI JS/RPCD Changes
- LuCI JS views and shared resources can be deployed directly to the router without rebuilding:
# Deploy JS views scp htdocs/luci-static/resources/view/<app>/*.js root@192.168.255.1:/www/luci-static/resources/view/<app>/ # Deploy shared JS libraries scp htdocs/luci-static/resources/<app>/*.js root@192.168.255.1:/www/luci-static/resources/<app>/ # Deploy RPCD handler and restart scp root/usr/libexec/rpcd/<handler> root@192.168.255.1:/usr/libexec/rpcd/ ssh root@192.168.255.1 '/etc/init.d/rpcd restart' # Clear LuCI caches on router ssh root@192.168.255.1 'rm -f /tmp/luci-indexcache* /tmp/luci-modulecache/*'
Common Pitfalls
- RPC params order matters: The
paramsarray inrpc.declare()must match the positional arguments inaddPeer(arg1, arg2, ...)calls — adding a new param means updating ALL callers - sessionStorage is volatile: Data stored in
sessionStorageis lost on tab close/refresh — don't rely on it for persistent data; use UCI backend storage instead - Interface name conflicts: When creating WireGuard interfaces, always check for existing names (wg0, wg1, etc.) and auto-increment to the next available name
Punk Exposure Engine — Architectural Directive
The SecuBox service exposure architecture follows a three-verb model called Peek / Poke / Emancipate. All new service components, exposure features, and mesh integrations must align with this model.
Core Concepts
- Peek: Discover and scan. Any feature that detects services, lists DNS records, shows mesh peers, or aggregates visibility across nodes.
- Poke: Target and configure. Any feature that selects a service and configures an exposure channel (Tor, DNS/SSL, mesh publish).
- Emancipate: Activate the linking flow. Any feature that atomically makes a service reachable through one or more channels.
Three Exposure Channels
- Tor —
.onionhidden services viasecubox-app-tor+secubox-exposure tor add - DNS/SSL — Classical HTTPS via HAProxy + ACME + DNS provider API (OVH, Gandi, Cloudflare) via
secubox-app-dns-provider+dnsctl - Mesh — P2P service registry via
secubox-p2p publish+ gossip chain sync
Key Architectural Rules
- Match services by port, not name — when cross-referencing scan results with Tor/SSL/vhost/mesh entries, always use the backend port number as the join key
- DNS provider API integration — use
dnsctl(fromsecubox-app-dns-provider) for programmatic DNS record management; support DNS-01 ACME challenges as alternative to HTTP-01 webroot - Emancipate is multi-channel — exposing a service should support activating Tor + DNS + Mesh in a single flow; each channel is independently togglable
- Every station is generative — each SecuBox node can discover local services, create new exposure endpoints, and propagate them to mesh peers
- Guard against local-only exposure — never auto-expose services bound to 127.0.0.1; only services on 0.0.0.0 or specific LAN IPs are eligible for external exposure
Reference Document
Full architectural spec: package/secubox/PUNK-EXPOSURE.md
Affected Packages
| Package | Role in Punk Exposure |
|---|---|
secubox-app-exposure |
Peek scanner + Tor/SSL orchestrator |
luci-app-exposure |
Dashboard: Peek table + Poke toggles |
secubox-app-tor |
Tor channel backend |
secubox-app-haproxy |
SSL/ACME channel backend |
secubox-app-dns-provider |
DNS provider API (to build) |
secubox-p2p |
Mesh channel + gossip sync |
secubox-master-link |
Node onboarding + trust hierarchy |
luci-app-service-registry |
Aggregated service catalog + health checks |