Merge pull request #523 from CyberMind-FR/feature/522-phase-13-b-dns-guard-resolve-blocklisted

Phase 13.A + 13.B — protection enforcement spine + DNS-guard (#521 #522)

packages/secubox-toolbox/debian/changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,55 @@
+secubox-toolbox (2.6.9-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+  * Phase 13.B (#522, parent #519) — DNS-guard : resolve blocklisted
+    domains into the enforcement set + DoH/DoT detection.
+      - secubox-blacklist-sync : Source 3 resolves threat_intel
+        ioc_type='domain' to A/AAAA (getent, per-lookup timeout 2s,
+        2000-domain cap) and pushes the IPs into blacklist_v4/v6 — so a
+        device that resolves a known-bad domain via DoH / hardcoded IP
+        is still dropped at the forward hook. Writes a state file
+        /run/secubox/blacklist-sync.json (resolved count + doh_block).
+      - nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft : doh_detect_v4/v6 sets + a
+        count-only doh_watch chain (priority -11) that counters device
+        egress to known DoH/DoT provider endpoints (Cloudflare/Google/
+        Quad9/AdGuard/OpenDNS/CleanBrowsing/Control-D/NextDNS) on
+        tcp 443/853. Detection only by default.
+      - secubox-blacklist-sync : populates the DoH sets every cycle ;
+        SECUBOX_DOH_BLOCK=1 ALSO adds them to the enforced blacklist
+        (forces devices back through Vortex DNS). Default off — gated.
+      - api.py /admin/blacklist : adds doh_detect counts, doh_hits
+        counter, resolved_domains, doh_block flag.
+    Detection-first ; DoH blocking opt-in only (intrusive, per #519 Q1).
+
+ -- Gerald KERMA <devel@cybermind.fr>  Thu, 11 Jun 2026 09:30:00 +0200
+
+secubox-toolbox (2.6.8-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+  * Phase 13.A (#521, parent #519) — unified blacklist enforcement spine.
+      - nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft : table inet secubox_blacklist
+        with blacklist_v4 / blacklist_v6 sets (flags interval,timeout)
+        + a single forward-hook chain (priority -10, policy accept) that
+        counter-drops any routed packet whose saddr OR daddr is
+        blacklisted. One rule set covers every device egress path
+        (captive / R3 WG / br-lxc / LAN) — no per-interface logic.
+        Loaded by nftables.service at boot ; survives reboot.
+      - sbin/secubox-blacklist-sync : unions CrowdSec ban decisions
+        (cscli) + threat-intel C2 IPs (threat_intel ip IOCs from
+        toolbox.db) into the sets, per-element timeout 2h (auto-expire
+        on stale feeds), 50k safety cap, idempotent add (no flush race
+        with CrowdSec's own table).
+      - systemd/secubox-blacklist-sync.{service,timer} : oneshot +
+        every-5-min timer (OnBootSec 90s).
+      - postinst : install drop-in to /etc/nftables.d/, reload nft,
+        enable+start the timer, kick a first sync.
+      - api.py : GET /admin/blacklist — element counts + drop counters
+        from nft -j (read-only status).
+    Doctrine preserved : policy accept only ADDS drops (a drop in any
+    chain wins) — never a WAF/default-drop bypass. Detection sources are
+    high-confidence only (CrowdSec bans + threat-intel C2) ; WAF-ban +
+    Vortex-resolved-IP feeds land in 13.B/13.D.
+
+ -- Gerald KERMA <devel@cybermind.fr>  Thu, 11 Jun 2026 09:00:00 +0200
+
 secubox-toolbox (2.6.7-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
 
   * Phase 12.C (#518, parent #514) — operator-grade / state-adjacent

packages/secubox-toolbox/debian/postinst

@@ -151,6 +151,26 @@ fi
       fi
     fi
 
+    # Phase 13.A (#521) : unified blacklist enforcement spine.
+    # nft drop-in (loaded by nftables.service at boot) + sync timer that
+    # unions CrowdSec decisions + threat-intel C2 IPs into the sets.
+    if [ -f /usr/share/secubox/toolbox/nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft ]; then
+      install -d -m 0755 /etc/nftables.d
+      install -m 0644 /usr/share/secubox/toolbox/nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft \
+        /etc/nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft
+      if systemctl is-active --quiet nftables.service 2>/dev/null; then
+        systemctl reload nftables.service 2>/dev/null \
+          || /usr/sbin/nft -f /etc/nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft 2>/dev/null \
+          || true
+      fi
+      if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
+        systemctl enable secubox-blacklist-sync.timer 2>/dev/null || true
+        systemctl start secubox-blacklist-sync.timer 2>/dev/null || true
+        # Kick an immediate first sync (best-effort).
+        systemctl start secubox-blacklist-sync.service 2>/dev/null || true
+      fi
+    fi
+
     # Phase 7 (#498) : install unbound listeners.
     # 99-secubox-wg.conf — WG peers (10.99.x). Without it WG peers' DNS
     #   queries get ICMP port unreachable and the iPhone stops resolving.

packages/secubox-toolbox/debian/rules

@@ -54,8 +54,14 @@ override_dh_installsystemd:
 override_dh_auto_test:
 	@true
 
-override_dh_strip:
-	@true
+# NOTE: dh_strip is NOT invoked in the binary-indep sequence (this is an
+# Architecture: all package with no binaries to strip), so an
+# override_dh_strip target would silently never run.  Everything that
+# used to live there is installed from execute_after_dh_auto_install
+# below — which DOES run — so nft drop-ins / unbound / nginx / perf
+# drop-ins / blacklist spine actually ship in the .deb (#521 caught the
+# stale-on-disk drift this caused).
+execute_after_dh_auto_install:
 	# Phase 6.Q (#496) : DB tuning helper + uvicorn perf drop-in
 	install -m 755 sbin/secubox-toolbox-db-tune \
 	  debian/secubox-toolbox/usr/sbin/
@@ -73,6 +79,15 @@ override_dh_strip:
 	# by symlinking /etc/nftables.d/secubox-toolbox-wg.nft → this file.
 	install -m 0644 nftables.d/secubox-toolbox-wg-fanout.nft \
 	  debian/secubox-toolbox/usr/share/secubox/toolbox/nftables.d/
+	# Phase 13.A (#521) : unified blacklist enforcement spine.
+	install -m 0644 nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft \
+	  debian/secubox-toolbox/usr/share/secubox/toolbox/nftables.d/
+	install -m 0755 sbin/secubox-blacklist-sync \
+	  debian/secubox-toolbox/usr/sbin/
+	install -m 0644 systemd/secubox-blacklist-sync.service \
+	  debian/secubox-toolbox/lib/systemd/system/
+	install -m 0644 systemd/secubox-blacklist-sync.timer \
+	  debian/secubox-toolbox/lib/systemd/system/
 	install -m 0755 sbin/secubox-toolbox-wg-restore \
 	  debian/secubox-toolbox/usr/sbin/
 	install -m 0644 systemd/secubox-toolbox-wg-restore.service \

packages/secubox-toolbox/nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CMSD-1.0
+# Copyright (c) 2026 CyberMind — Gérald Kerma <devel@cybermind.fr>
+#
+# Phase 13.A (#521) — unified blacklist enforcement spine.
+#
+# One authoritative pair of sets (v4/v6) fed by secubox-blacklist-sync
+# from ALL ban sources (CrowdSec decisions + threat-intel C2 IPs ;
+# WAF-ban + Vortex-resolved feeds land in 13.B/13.D).  A single
+# forward-hook chain drops any ROUTED packet whose source OR destination
+# is blacklisted — so it covers every device egress path at once
+# (captive 10.99.0.0/24, R3 WG wg-toolbox 10.99.1.0/24, br-lxc, LAN)
+# with no per-interface logic.
+#
+# Doctrine : policy accept here only ADDS drops ; it never bypasses the
+# main inet filter default-drop (a drop in any chain wins regardless of
+# another chain's accept policy).  Loaded by nftables.service at boot
+# via /etc/nftables.d/*.nft so it survives reboot (#498/#501 pattern).
+#
+# The sets are `interval` (CIDR support) + `timeout` (elements auto-expire
+# if the sync stops re-adding them — fail-open on stale data, never a
+# permanent black hole from a one-off bad feed).
+#
+# Idempotent load : the create-or-replace idiom below makes `nft -f` on
+# this file safe to run repeatedly (postinst reload, manual reload)
+# WITHOUT appending duplicate rules to the chains. The sets are wiped on
+# reload but secubox-blacklist-sync repopulates them immediately (postinst
+# kicks a sync ; the timer keeps them fresh every 5 min) — a brief empty
+# window is the fail-open direction anyway.
+table inet secubox_blacklist { }
+delete table inet secubox_blacklist
+
+table inet secubox_blacklist {
+    set blacklist_v4 {
+        type ipv4_addr
+        flags interval, timeout
+    }
+    set blacklist_v6 {
+        type ipv6_addr
+        flags interval, timeout
+    }
+
+    chain enforce {
+        type filter hook forward priority -10; policy accept;
+        ip  daddr @blacklist_v4 counter drop
+        ip  saddr @blacklist_v4 counter drop
+        ip6 daddr @blacklist_v6 counter drop
+        ip6 saddr @blacklist_v6 counter drop
+    }
+
+    # Phase 13.B (#522) — DoH/DoT detection. COUNT-ONLY by default : a
+    # device reaching a known DoH/DoT provider endpoint is counted (for
+    # passive stats + the "this device bypasses Vortex DNS" signal) but
+    # NOT blocked. Blocking is opt-in : secubox-blacklist-sync with
+    # SECUBOX_DOH_BLOCK=1 ALSO adds these IPs to blacklist_v4/v6 above,
+    # where the enforce chain drops them — forcing the device back through
+    # Vortex DNS. Default off (intrusive ; gated per #519 open Q1).
+    set doh_detect_v4 {
+        type ipv4_addr
+        flags interval, timeout
+    }
+    set doh_detect_v6 {
+        type ipv6_addr
+        flags interval, timeout
+    }
+    chain doh_watch {
+        type filter hook forward priority -11; policy accept;
+        ip  daddr @doh_detect_v4 tcp dport { 443, 853 } counter
+        ip6 daddr @doh_detect_v6 tcp dport { 443, 853 } counter
+    }
+}

packages/secubox-toolbox/sbin/secubox-blacklist-sync

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CMSD-1.0
+# Copyright (c) 2026 CyberMind — Gérald Kerma <devel@cybermind.fr>
+#
+# SecuBox-Deb :: secubox-blacklist-sync
+#
+# Phase 13.A (#521) — union all ban sources into the nft enforcement
+# sets (inet secubox_blacklist blacklist_v4 / blacklist_v6).  Idempotent,
+# safe to run on a timer.  Each element gets a timeout so stale entries
+# auto-expire if a source stops listing them.
+set -euo pipefail
+readonly MODULE="secubox-blacklist-sync"
+readonly VERSION="13.A"
+
+NFT=/usr/sbin/nft
+TABLE="inet secubox_blacklist"
+TOOLBOX_DB=/var/lib/secubox/toolbox/toolbox.db
+ELEM_TIMEOUT="${SECUBOX_BL_TIMEOUT:-2h}"   # auto-expiry per element
+# Safety cap : never load more than this many IPs (a runaway feed
+# shouldn't be able to black-hole the box).
+MAX_ELEMS="${SECUBOX_BL_MAX:-50000}"
+
+log() { logger -t "$MODULE" -- "$*" 2>/dev/null || echo "[$MODULE] $*" >&2; }
+
+# The nft table must already exist (loaded by nftables.service from the
+# drop-in).  If it doesn't, load the drop-in once.
+if ! $NFT list table $TABLE >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    if [ -r /etc/nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft ]; then
+        $NFT -f /etc/nftables.d/secubox-blacklist.nft || {
+            log "ERROR: table missing and drop-in load failed"; exit 1; }
+    else
+        log "ERROR: table $TABLE missing and no drop-in to load"; exit 1
+    fi
+fi
+
+# ── Collect IPs from all sources into temp files (v4 / v6) ──
+TMP4=$(mktemp); TMP6=$(mktemp)
+trap 'rm -f "$TMP4" "$TMP6"' EXIT
+
+# Source 1 : threat-intel C2 IPs (feodo / threatfox / sslbl) from the
+# toolbox SQLite. ioc_type='ip'.
+if [ -r "$TOOLBOX_DB" ] && command -v sqlite3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    sqlite3 "$TOOLBOX_DB" \
+        "SELECT DISTINCT ioc FROM threat_intel WHERE ioc_type='ip';" \
+        2>/dev/null >> "$TMP4.raw" || true
+fi
+
+# Source 2 : CrowdSec decisions (ban scope=Ip). JSON via cscli.
+if command -v cscli >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    cscli decisions list -o json 2>/dev/null \
+      | { command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+            && jq -r '.[] | select(.decisions != null) | .decisions[] | select(.type=="ban") | .value' 2>/dev/null \
+            || sed -n 's/.*"value":"\([0-9a-fA-F:.]*\)".*/\1/p'; } \
+      >> "$TMP4.raw" || true
+fi
+
+# Source 3 (Phase 13.B #522) : DNS-guard — resolve blocklisted DOMAINS
+# (threat_intel ioc_type='domain') to their A/AAAA records and add those
+# IPs. Closes the DoH / hardcoded-IP bypass : even if a device resolves a
+# known-bad domain out-of-band, the resulting IP is dropped at forward.
+# Bounded : cap on domains/cycle + per-lookup timeout so the sync never
+# hangs on a dead resolver.
+DOMAIN_CAP="${SECUBOX_BL_DOMAIN_CAP:-2000}"
+RESOLVE_TIMEOUT="${SECUBOX_BL_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT:-2}"
+resolved_domains=0
+if [ -r "$TOOLBOX_DB" ] && command -v sqlite3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    while IFS= read -r dom; do
+        [ -n "$dom" ] || continue
+        # getent ahosts returns both A + AAAA ; timeout guards a dead lookup.
+        ips=$(timeout "$RESOLVE_TIMEOUT" getent ahosts "$dom" 2>/dev/null \
+                | awk '{print $1}' | sort -u)
+        if [ -n "$ips" ]; then
+            printf '%s\n' "$ips" >> "$TMP4.raw"
+            resolved_domains=$((resolved_domains + 1))
+        fi
+    done < <(sqlite3 "$TOOLBOX_DB" \
+        "SELECT DISTINCT ioc FROM threat_intel WHERE ioc_type='domain' LIMIT $DOMAIN_CAP;" \
+        2>/dev/null)
+fi
+
+# Split v4 / v6, validate, dedup, cap.
+if [ -f "$TMP4.raw" ]; then
+    # IPv6 = contains a colon ; IPv4 = dotted quad (optionally /CIDR).
+    grep -E ':' "$TMP4.raw" 2>/dev/null | grep -vE '^\s*$' | sort -u > "$TMP6" || true
+    grep -vE ':' "$TMP4.raw" 2>/dev/null \
+      | grep -E '^([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}(/[0-9]{1,2})?$' \
+      | sort -u > "$TMP4" || true
+    rm -f "$TMP4.raw"
+fi
+
+n4=$(wc -l < "$TMP4" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
+n6=$(wc -l < "$TMP6" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
+
+if [ "$n4" -gt "$MAX_ELEMS" ]; then
+    log "WARN: $n4 v4 IPs exceeds cap $MAX_ELEMS — truncating"
+    head -n "$MAX_ELEMS" "$TMP4" > "$TMP4.cap" && mv "$TMP4.cap" "$TMP4"
+    n4=$MAX_ELEMS
+fi
+
+# ── Push into the nft sets (batched add-element with per-elem timeout) ──
+# We don't flush : timeouts handle expiry, and re-adding refreshes the
+# timeout on still-active entries. Batching keeps it to one nft call.
+add_batch() {
+    local set="$1" file="$2" fam="$3"
+    [ -s "$file" ] || return 0
+    local elems
+    elems=$(awk -v t="$ELEM_TIMEOUT" 'NF{printf "%s timeout %s, ", $1, t}' "$file")
+    elems="${elems%, }"
+    [ -n "$elems" ] || return 0
+    # add (not flush+add) so concurrent CrowdSec table updates don't race.
+    $NFT add element $TABLE "$set" "{ $elems }" 2>/dev/null \
+        || log "WARN: partial add to $set ($fam)"
+}
+
+add_batch blacklist_v4 "$TMP4" v4
+add_batch blacklist_v6 "$TMP6" v6
+
+# ── Phase 13.B (#522) : DoH/DoT detection-list population ──
+# Known DoH/DoT provider endpoints. Count-only by default (the doh_watch
+# chain just counters) ; SECUBOX_DOH_BLOCK=1 also adds them to the
+# enforced blacklist so devices are forced back through Vortex DNS.
+DOH_BLOCK="${SECUBOX_DOH_BLOCK:-0}"
+DOH_V4="1.1.1.1 1.0.0.1 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4 9.9.9.9 149.112.112.112 \
+94.140.14.14 94.140.15.15 208.67.222.222 208.67.220.220 \
+185.228.168.9 76.76.2.0 76.76.10.0 45.90.28.0 45.90.30.0"
+DOH_V6="2606:4700:4700::1111 2606:4700:4700::1001 2001:4860:4860::8888 \
+2001:4860:4860::8844 2620:fe::fe 2620:fe::9"
+doh4_elems=$(printf '%s ' $DOH_V4 | awk -v t="$ELEM_TIMEOUT" '{for(i=1;i<=NF;i++)printf "%s timeout %s, ",$i,t}')
+doh6_elems=$(printf '%s ' $DOH_V6 | awk -v t="$ELEM_TIMEOUT" '{for(i=1;i<=NF;i++)printf "%s timeout %s, ",$i,t}')
+[ -n "$doh4_elems" ] && $NFT add element $TABLE doh_detect_v4 "{ ${doh4_elems%, } }" 2>/dev/null || true
+[ -n "$doh6_elems" ] && $NFT add element $TABLE doh_detect_v6 "{ ${doh6_elems%, } }" 2>/dev/null || true
+if [ "$DOH_BLOCK" = "1" ]; then
+    # Opt-in : also enforce-drop DoH so devices fall back to Vortex.
+    [ -n "$doh4_elems" ] && $NFT add element $TABLE blacklist_v4 "{ ${doh4_elems%, } }" 2>/dev/null || true
+    [ -n "$doh6_elems" ] && $NFT add element $TABLE blacklist_v6 "{ ${doh6_elems%, } }" 2>/dev/null || true
+fi
+
+# ── Report + state file (consumed by /admin/blacklist) ──
+live4=$($NFT list set $TABLE blacklist_v4 2>/dev/null | grep -c 'timeout' || echo 0)
+live6=$($NFT list set $TABLE blacklist_v6 2>/dev/null | grep -c 'timeout' || echo 0)
+STATE=/run/secubox/blacklist-sync.json
+mkdir -p /run/secubox 2>/dev/null || true
+printf '{"ts":%s,"v4_added":%s,"v6_added":%s,"resolved_domains":%s,"doh_block":%s}\n' \
+    "$(date +%s)" "${n4:-0}" "${n6:-0}" "${resolved_domains:-0}" "${DOH_BLOCK}" \
+    > "$STATE" 2>/dev/null || true
+log "synced: +${n4} v4 / +${n6} v6 (live ~${live4}/${live6}, resolved ${resolved_domains:-0} domains, doh_block=${DOH_BLOCK}, timeout ${ELEM_TIMEOUT})"
+exit 0

packages/secubox-toolbox/secubox_toolbox/api.py

@@ -2085,6 +2085,74 @@ async def admin_social_aggregate(hours: int = 24) -> dict:
     return _s.aggregate(hours=hours)
 
 
+@router.get("/admin/blacklist")
+async def admin_blacklist() -> dict:
+    """Phase 13.A (#521) + 13.B (#522) — enforcement-spine status :
+    element counts + drop counters of the unified nft blacklist sets,
+    plus the DoH/DoT detection counters and the last-sync state.
+    Read-only ; parses `nft -j list table inet secubox_blacklist`.
+    """
+    import json as _json
+    import subprocess as _sp
+    from pathlib import Path as _P
+    out: dict = {
+        "active": False,
+        "v4_count": 0,
+        "v6_count": 0,
+        "drops": 0,
+        "doh_detect_v4": 0,
+        "doh_detect_v6": 0,
+        "doh_hits": 0,
+        "resolved_domains": 0,
+        "doh_block": False,
+        "sources": ["crowdsec", "threat-intel", "dns-guard"],
+    }
+    try:
+        r = _sp.run(
+            ["/usr/sbin/nft", "-j", "list", "table", "inet", "secubox_blacklist"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5,
+        )
+        if r.returncode == 0:
+            data = _json.loads(r.stdout or "{}")
+            for item in data.get("nftables", []):
+                if "set" in item:
+                    s = item["set"]
+                    n = len(s.get("elem", []) or [])
+                    name = s.get("name")
+                    if name == "blacklist_v4":
+                        out["v4_count"] = n
+                    elif name == "blacklist_v6":
+                        out["v6_count"] = n
+                    elif name == "doh_detect_v4":
+                        out["doh_detect_v4"] = n
+                    elif name == "doh_detect_v6":
+                        out["doh_detect_v6"] = n
+                if "rule" in item:
+                    chain = item["rule"].get("chain", "")
+                    for ex in item["rule"].get("expr", []):
+                        c = ex.get("counter")
+                        if not c:
+                            continue
+                        pk = int(c.get("packets", 0) or 0)
+                        if chain == "doh_watch":
+                            out["doh_hits"] += pk
+                        else:
+                            out["drops"] += pk
+            out["active"] = True
+    except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001
+        log.warning("admin_blacklist nft parse failed: %s", e)
+    # Last-sync state file (resolved-domain count + doh_block flag).
+    try:
+        st = _P("/run/secubox/blacklist-sync.json")
+        if st.exists():
+            j = _json.loads(st.read_text())
+            out["resolved_domains"] = int(j.get("resolved_domains", 0) or 0)
+            out["doh_block"] = str(j.get("doh_block", "0")) == "1"
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return out
+
+
 @router.get("/social/report/{token}.pdf")
 async def social_report_pdf(token: str) -> Response:
     """Phase 11.C (#508) — bilingual FR/EN evidence PDF for a peer.

packages/secubox-toolbox/systemd/secubox-blacklist-sync.service

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CMSD-1.0
+# Phase 13.A (#521) — union ban sources into the nft blacklist sets.
+[Unit]
+Description=SecuBox blacklist enforcement sync (CrowdSec + threat-intel -> nft sets)
+Documentation=https://github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb/issues/521
+After=nftables.service secubox-toolbox.service
+Wants=nftables.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/secubox-blacklist-sync
+# Needs CAP_NET_ADMIN for nft set writes ; root is simplest + the script
+# is read-only against the toolbox DB + cscli.
+User=root
+Nice=10
+IOSchedulingClass=idle
+TimeoutStartSec=120
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

packages/secubox-toolbox/systemd/secubox-blacklist-sync.timer

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CMSD-1.0
+# Phase 13.A (#521) — periodic blacklist sync.
+[Unit]
+Description=SecuBox blacklist sync timer (every 5 min + boot)
+Documentation=https://github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb/issues/521
+
+[Timer]
+# Run shortly after boot, then every 5 minutes. The element timeout
+# (2h) is well above the period so active entries never lapse.
+OnBootSec=90s
+OnUnitActiveSec=5min
+AccuracySec=30s
+Persistent=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target