docs(spec): toolbox cert-mismatch warn-and-allow (no 502) design

sbxmitm classifies a non-validating upstream cert (expired/self-signed/
hostname-mismatch/third-party) without ever hard-failing, keeps the site
accessible under the R3 CA, injects a per-site dismissible identity-warning
banner (keyed on cert fingerprint, re-alerts if it changes), logs a
cert_anomaly SOC event, and notifies only on the third-party (active
impersonation) class. Replaces the current 502 on upstream cert failure.

.claude/HISTORY.md

@@ -3,6 +3,405 @@
 
 ---
 
+## 2026-07-01 — Macro subsystem (M2) + tor-exit reference kind (#771)
+
+Services can now propose a vetted, AppArmor-confined **access macro** so an approved peer
+consumes them. First increment: framework + `tor-exit` (SOCKS-over-mesh). Three packages:
+- **secubox-annuaire 0.3.3** — optional signed `ServiceOffer.macro {kind, params}` that
+  federates in the signed payload (byte-stability guard keeps macro-less offers compatible
+  with pre-0.3.0 signatures); `annuairectl offer --macro-kind/--macro-param`.
+- **secubox-macro 0.1.0 (NEW)** — `secubox-macroctl` root dispatcher (kind allowlist, plugin
+  root-owned+non-writable tamper guard, src-ip mesh-CIDR check, euid-gated env-ignore,
+  append-only audit) + `macros.d/tor-exit` (nft grant/revoke, service_id path-traversal
+  sanitize, socks_port bound) + tight sudoers (env_reset) + AppArmor enforce (net_admin) +
+  postinst (Tor SocksPort on mesh IP, nft base set, audit pre-create).
+- **secubox-p2p 1.9.0** — provider grant endpoint (self-signed Subscription auth: self-cert
+  DID + ed25519 over annuaire's canonical bytes; auto-mode only), consumer activate pulls
+  the credential over the mesh + runs macroctl activate, mesh listener :8798 (mesh-IP-only,
+  X-Real-IP), revoke-access, NNP=no for the sudo path, UI SOCKS endpoint + Revoke.
+
+Built via SDD (8 tasks, per-task + final opus review = READY TO MERGE). The review loop caught
+and fixed **6 Criticals**: offer-signature wire-break (macro:null changed signed bytes),
+tor-exit root path-traversal (service_id as root filename), prerm mawk-bricks-dpkg, macroctl
+NNP-blocks-sudo, macroctl env-injection root-RCE + missing root-ownership guard. Deployed the
+3 debs to gk2 + c3box; **proven live on c3box under AppArmor enforce**: macroctl→tor-exit grant
+adds a mesh IP to the `secubox_macro_torexit` nft set + returns the endpoint + writes an
+append-only audit line; revoke empties it; bad-kind/non-mesh-IP/missing-src-ip all rejected.
+Full cross-node federation + real Tor routing is env-blocked (Tor not installed on c3box; gk2
+uses `inet filter` not `secubox_filter`) — not a code issue. Suites: annuaire 189, p2p 49,
+macro 14.
+
+---
+
+## 2026-06-30 — secubox-p2p 1.8.0 : Service Registry = live view of annuaire catalog (#769)
+
+Le registre de services p2p (`/p2p/`) affichait « No services registered » (JSON local
+isolé), déconnecté du catalogue fédéré secubox-annuaire 0.2.0. Désormais c'est une **vue
+live** : `GET /services` fusionne le catalogue annuaire + mes abonnements + un mince
+*activation overlay* + les services p2p-locaux hérités (sans duplication, sans dérive).
+`api/registry.py` (fusion pure, testable) + `api/annuaire_client.py` (lit
+`/run/secubox/annuaire.sock`, jamais l'aggregator ; s'abonne EN TANT QUE nœud via la clé
+0600 ; frappe un JWT de service car le subscribe annuaire est JWT-gated). 4 endpoints :
+`GET /services` (dégrade en `catalog_unavailable`, ne 500 jamais), `POST
+/services/auto-register` (active les offres locales + s'abonne aux distantes selon
+auto/pending), `/{id}/request`, `/{id}/activate`. UI : bouton « Auto register all » +
+Request access / Activate + badges d'état (service_id en encodeURIComponent — XSS-safe).
+annuaire inchangé ; exécution des macros déférée au Milestone 2.
+
+Construit via SDD (5 tâches TDD + revues par tâche + revue finale opus = READY TO MERGE).
+Bug trouvé au déploiement : le subscribe annuaire est JWT-gated ET vérifie que le sujet est
+un user activé → token de service frappé pour `admin` (override SBX_SERVICE_USER). 34 tests.
+Déployé gk2 + c3box : `GET /services` = WAF mirror (local) + Suricata (fédéré de c3box) sur
+gk2, image miroir sur c3box ; `auto-register` gk2 = {activated:1, requested:1} → Suricata
+fédéré **approved**. 
+
+---
+
+## 2026-06-30 — secubox-annuaire 0.2.0 : trustless cross-node service federation (#766)
+
+Le `/services/pull` de 0.1.3 n'était **pas** réellement sans-confiance ni opérable :
+`ingest_offer` vérifiait la signature contre une pubkey *fournie par l'appelant* sans
+jamais contrôler `did_from_pubkey(pubkey) == provider` (forge « apporte ta clé, réclame
+n'importe quel DID ») ; et `GET /services` renvoyait des offres **sans signature ni
+pubkey** (le payload stocké les omet), donc un pair inconnu ne pouvait rien vérifier.
+
+Corrigé :
+- **Ingest sans-confiance** : `ingest_offer` impose `did_from_pubkey(pubkey)==provider`
+  AVANT la vérif de signature. did:plc = sha256(pubkey)[:32] → liaison auto-certifiante,
+  aucun annuaire, aucune confiance préalable.
+- **Offres auto-portées** : `_get_offers`/`GET /services` ré-attachent `sig` + `signer_did`
+  + `provider_pubkey` (métadonnée de transport, retirée avant reconstruction du modèle
+  extra=forbid). `pull_services` les consomme.
+- **Bootstrap de nœud** : verbe `genesis()` (un nœud s'auto-atteste MEMBER fondateur,
+  brise le paradoxe invite/join ; DID auto-certifiant, `invited_by` vide → n'inflige
+  jamais la pluralité d'émancipation ; idempotent). `Op.GENESIS` (additif). CLI
+  `/usr/sbin/annuairectl` (init|whoami|status|offer|services|pull) opérant le journal
+  directement en tant que `secubox` (pas de JWT pour le bootstrap privilégié) ; clé 0600
+  dans `/etc/secubox/secrets/annuaire/node.key`.
+- **Écouteur mesh** : `annuaire-mesh.conf.tpl` rendu par postinst sur l'IP wg-mesh du
+  nœud uniquement (`10.10.0.1:8799` sur gk2), `allow 10.10.0.0/24 + deny all`, GET
+  `/services` seul.
+- **Tests** : +7 (forge, payload altéré, hex invalide, round-trip), 134 passants.
+- **Revue sécurité** : aucune forge exploitable. Deux durcissements board-wide :
+  postinst valide l'écouteur rendu via `nginx -t` et le retire si échec (un rendu cassé
+  ne persiste jamais) ; livraison de `ip_nonlocal_bind=1` (nginx lie l'IP mesh même si
+  wg-quick@wg-mesh démarre après nginx).
+
+Déployé sur gk2 (0.1.3 → 0.2.0) : service actif, `nginx -t` OK, écouteur live, genesis
+gk2 (DID `0463…`) + offre « WAF mirror ». **Démo live** : un second nœud (fondateur
+distinct, gk2 inconnu) `annuairectl pull http://10.10.0.1:8799` → ingested 1, chain_ok.
+Reste : pull live gk2→c3box bloqué (clé SSH non autorisée sur .94) ; NIZK/PSI GK·HAM à venir.
+
+---
+
+## 2026-06-30 — secubox-yacy 1.0.12 : repair webui embed + navbar integration
+
+Page admin `https://admin.gk2.secubox.in/yacy/` cassée sur deux points, corrigés dans
+[`www/yacy/index.html`](../packages/secubox-yacy/www/yacy/index.html) :
+
+- **webui (iframe récursif)** : l'`<iframe src="/yacy/">` pointait sur **cette même page**
+  (nginx sert `/yacy/` en `alias` statique, pas en proxy) → le panneau s'affichait
+  récursivement au lieu de l'UI YaCy. Le `src` est désormais construit au runtime depuis
+  `/api/v1/yacy/access`, en préférant l'URL **publique https** (`yacy.gk2.secubox.in`,
+  vérifiée sans X-Frame-Options/CSP → framable) pour éviter le blocage mixed-content ;
+  repli sur un lien « ouvrir dans un nouvel onglet » si seule une URL http LAN est joignable.
+- **navbar** : la page utilisait une grille CSS `.layout` custom + `sidebar-light.css`
+  legacy, en conflit avec `sidebar.js` v2.33 (injecteur hybrid-skin). Migration vers le
+  pattern canonique (annuaire/cookies) : `design-tokens.css` + `crt-light.css`,
+  `<nav class="sidebar">` + `sidebar.js`, contenu dans `<main class="main">`. Strings
+  issues de l'API échappées avant injection.
+
+Déployé live sur gk2 (`/usr/share/secubox/www/yacy/index.html`, backup `.bak-pre-fix`),
+copie debian stagée synchronisée, bump 1.0.11 → 1.0.12. Assets `/shared/*` 200, JS
+`node --check` OK.
+
+**Cause racine réelle des cartes « unavailable » + « no search results »** : drift nginx
+live. `/etc/nginx/secubox-routes.d/yacy.conf` (inclus par le vhost admin) avait dérivé vers
+`proxy_pass …/aggregator.sock` en gardant le `rewrite` qui dénude le préfixe → l'aggregator
+(modules montés sur le chemin **complet** `/api/v1/yacy/*`) recevait `/access` nu → 404 →
+`.catch()` du JS → iframe jamais construit → pas d'UI YaCy. Réaligné sur la config livrée
+(`yacy.sock`, ~0,2 s vs 11-20 s via l'aggregator qui bloquait sa boucle). YaCy jamais cassé
+(freeworld, 352 global / 466 local pour « debian »). Même pattern que Lyrion #763 ci-dessous.
+
+**Phase 2 — yacyctl detection + sudoers + postinst + .deb** :
+- `yacyctl` reportait lxc « absent » / daemon « stopped » / overall **red** alors que tout
+  tournait : `secubox-yacy.service` tourne en `User=secubox` + `NoNewPrivileges=true`, et
+  `lxc-info`/`lxc-attach` exigent root (NNP bloque sudo). Remplacé par une **sonde réseau
+  privilège-free** (`curl http://$LXC_IP:$HTTP_PORT/`) — préserve le durcissement, signal
+  plus vrai. `lxc-info` gardé en enrichissement best-effort root-only. → vert via l'API.
+- Ship `/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-yacy` (lxc-*) pour `yacyctl reload` (restart daemon in-LXC).
+- `postinst` : `systemctl restart` inconditionnel — `deb-systemd-invoke restart` de
+  dh_installsystemd **refuse** de démarrer une unité *disabled* → upgrade laissait
+  `yacy.sock` absent → 502. (Piège de test : dpkg s'arrête sur un **prompt conffile** quand
+  on a édité les `/etc` à la main → `--force-confnew` pour aligner.)
+- Construit + installé `secubox-yacy_1.0.12-1~bookworm1_all.deb` (output/debs/). Upgrade
+  propre validé : service active+enabled, dashboard vert, recherche 466, route `yacy.sock`.
+
+---
+
+## 2026-06-30 — Lyrion admin 404 → dedicated-socket extraction (#763)
+
+Page `https://admin.gk2.secubox.in/lyrion/` : tous les widgets en **HTTP 404**.
+
+### Cause racine
+La route nginx `/api/v1/lyrion/` avait dérivé sur la board vers
+`rewrite … /$1 break;` + `proxy_pass …/aggregator.sock;` (sans suffixe `/api/v1/lyrion/`).
+L'aggregator monte les modules au chemin **complet** `/api/v1/lyrion/…`, donc le `/status`
+dénudé → 404. (`curl aggregator.sock /api/v1/lyrion/status` → 200 ; `/status` → 404.)
+
+### Décision — extraction socket dédié (comme auth/metrics)
+Les handlers `now-playing` / `players` font du JSON-RPC LMS **bloquant** à chaque requête.
+Sur la boucle unique de l'aggregator (~110 modules) un appel LMS lent fige toute la
+passerelle → 502 board-wide (SPOF observé). lyrion repasse sur son propre
+`secubox-lyrion.service` + `/run/secubox/lyrion.sock` + route nginx dédiée.
+
+### Changements
+- **source** `packages/secubox-lyrion/nginx/lyrion.conf` : invariant documenté (dedicated
+  socket, ne jamais folder dans l'aggregator).
+- **source** `packages/secubox-lyrion/debian/postinst` : préserve l'état runtime sur upgrade
+  (`try-restart`), démarre au fresh install si le LXC LMS répond.
+- **source** `packages/secubox-aggregator/sbin/secubox-aggregator-migrate` : `AGG_EXCLUDE`
+  (lyrion) → discovery + switch route + disable service le sautent (durabilité).
+- **board** : `secubox-lyrion.service` enable --now ; route nginx (secubox.d +
+  secubox-routes.d) → `lyrion.sock` ; reload. 5 endpoints à 200, stream live affiché.
+- **gotcha** : le 1er `enable --now` a re-chown `/run/secubox` (1777 root:root →
+  755 secubox:secubox) car le drop-in `no-runtime-dir.conf` (`RuntimeDirectory=`) n'était pas
+  rechargé en mémoire systemd. `daemon-reload` + restaure le parent à 1777 root:root → restart
+  ne le re-casse plus (boot-safe).
+
+---
+
+## 2026-06-27 — LAN standardisé 192.168.10.0/24 + c3box/gk2 live Freebox + bump 1.10.0 (#760)
+
+Session terrain "c3box derrière Freebox" : la LAN SecuBox par défaut (`br-lan 192.168.1.1/24`)
+entrait en collision avec la LAN d'un routeur opérateur courant (Freebox/Livebox en
+`192.168.1.0/24`). En aval d'une Freebox, le WAN DHCP et la LAN se retrouvaient sur le **même
+sous-réseau** → route dupliquée, ARP ambigu, IP de management injoignable.
+
+### A. Constat live + remédiation immédiate
+- **c3box** (second MOCHAbin) derrière Freebox : WAN `eth2=192.168.1.94` (bail Freebox) +
+  `br-lan=192.168.1.1/24` → `.94` injoignable depuis le LAN. Corrigé live : `br-lan → 192.168.10.1/24`.
+  SSH root activé, webadmin `https://192.168.1.94/` OK, `/dev/sda1` (931 G) monté sur `/data`
+  (style gk2 : UUID + nofail), partition eMMC retirée (`emmc-data`).
+- **gk2** (live PoC) : uplink déplacé de `lan0` (DSA) vers le port cuivre WAN `eth2` ; netplan
+  réparé via **série** (gk2 hors-réseau le temps du switch) → `eth2 dhcp4: true`, `lan0` dépouillé.
+  Bail Freebox réservé sur le MAC eth2 `f0:ad:4e:27:88:9b` → gk2 reprend `192.168.1.200`. Persisté.
+
+### B. Standardisation source (LAN = 192.168.10.0/24, gw .10.1) — 17 fichiers
+- Netplans board : mochabin, espressobin-v7, espressobin-ultra, x64-vm, x64-live (`br-lan`),
+  + unification VM vm-x64/vm-arm64 (`192.168.100.1 → 192.168.10.1`).
+- Générateurs de netplan : `secubox-netmodes`, `secubox-hub` (preview), `secubox-net-detect`.
+- dnsmasq (`espressobin-v7.conf`) : `dhcp-range` + `option:router` + `option:dns-server`.
+- Scripts live-usb (mochabin/ebin) + SAN des certs auto-signés (`firstboot`, `build-image`,
+  `build-rpi-usb`, `build-live-usb`) → `IP:192.168.10.1`.
+- **Hors scope (intacts)** : `192.168.255.1` (whitelist mgmt/trusted-proxy WAF/mail/wg/mitm),
+  listes `GATEWAYS` de sonde WAN, exemples remote-ui/round + tests.
+
+### C. Release
+- Bump mineur (« medium ») **1.9.0 → 1.10.0** : `build-image.sh`, `build-live-usb.sh`,
+  `build-ebin-live-usb.sh`, `build-rpi-usb.sh` (mochabin-live reste sur sa piste 2.0.0).
+- Artefacts amd64 (x64) reconstruits depuis cette base.
+
+---
+
+## 2026-06-27 — Netboot live PROUVÉ + première install SecuBox Debian sur c3box (second MOCHAbin) (#748 #737)
+
+Grande session hardware : netboot gk2→c3box validé de bout en bout, premier SecuBox Debian installé
+sur un vrai MOCHAbin, et le blocage U-Boot qui empêche #748 de fermer est formellement documenté.
+
+### A. Netboot gk2 → c3box : validé en prod
+
+- **c3box** (second MOCHAbin, Armada 7040) a booté l'installeur SecuBox Debian servi par gk2 via
+  TFTP : factory U-Boot 2020.10 → `tftpboot Image/dtb/initrd` → `booti` → rescue shell installeur,
+  kernel custom 6.12.85 #5secubox. Le FIT signé (49 Mo) était servi en HTTP sur `:8099`.
+- Le long détour cabling était une impasse LAB (prouvé via gk2 bridge-FDB + test DHCP) — aucun
+  bug logiciel.
+- **Learnings opérationnels réutilisables** (documentés dans `wiki/Netboot-Install.md`) :
+  - Factory U-Boot 2020.10 s'interrompt sur **Enter** (pas Ctrl-C), `bootdelay=2`.
+  - Son env n'est PAS dans SPI mtd2 (env étranger fossile) → `fw_setenv` depuis Linux n'a aucun
+    effet ; seule la config U-Boot interne compte.
+  - Seul le port cuivre RJ45 unique = `mvpp2-2` est bootable par le factory U-Boot (les 4 ports
+    switch nécessitent le driver MV88E6XXX DSA, absent au boot).
+  - Kernel load à `0x02080000` = adresse mémoire réservée → crash immédiat ; utiliser `0x0a000000`.
+  - `setenv tftpblocksize 1468` pour TFTP rapide.
+
+### B. #748 enhanced Tow-Boot (HTTP/wget bootloader) — DIFFÉRÉ, bloquant documenté
+
+Branche `feature/748-enhanced-tow-boot-http-netboot-serial-fl` (stackée sur #737) :
+spec+plan (`docs/superpowers/`), Kconfig Tow-Boot, `build-uboot-overlay.sh --tow-boot`,
+plan serial-flasher, CI `.github/workflows/build-tow-boot.yml` (push-triggered).
+
+**Bloquant dur (ciseau)** : le board MOCHAbin n'existe que dans le fork U-Boot 2022.07 de
+Tow-Boot (pas de `wget`) ; `wget` n'existe que dans U-Boot stock ≥2023.07 (pas de board
+mochabin/DTS). Bump à stock 2023.07 = `wget` compile mais build sans DTS. Pour débloquer :
+backporter wget/TCP dans le fork Tow-Boot 2022.07, OU porter le board mochabin vers mainline
+≥2023.07. Pas un tweak de config.
+
+### C. PREMIÈRE INSTALL — c3box → SecuBox Debian (la headline)
+
+- **Image** : artefact CI `secubox-mochabin-bookworm` (run 27426515472, 1,8 Go gzip / 8,0 Gio
+  décompressé), téléchargée sur gk2 `/data`, SHA256SUMS vérifié.
+- **Signature** : clé `secubox-netboot.key` de gk2. Vérifié : cette clé FIT == `netboot-image.pub`
+  embarquée dans l'installeur (modulus match + roundtrip sign/verify). `sbx.img.gz` + `.sig`
+  publiés dans le root HTTP netboot, servis sur `:8099` (symlink depuis `/data`).
+- **Install automatisé depuis le rescue shell** :
+  `wget sbx.img.gz` (en RAM, c3box a 8 Go) →
+  `openssl dgst -verify` contre `netboot-image.pub` (résultat : Verified OK) →
+  `gunzip | dd of=/dev/mmcblk0 bs=4M conv=fsync` (8 Gio, progression 32→62→94→100%) → sync.
+- **c3box démarre SecuBox Debian v1.9.0** — hostname `secubox-mochabin`, kernel Debian
+  6.1.0-47-arm64, stack complète : secuboxd, hub, grafana, zigbee, mqtt, authelia,
+  sentinel/rogue-BTS (layers WALL+MIND). Creds root/secubox, Web UI `:9443`.
+- **Fix auto-boot persistant** : l'image utilise `extlinux.conf` à `0x02080000` (adresse réservée
+  factory U-Boot → reset immédiat) et ne livre pas de `boot.scr` compilé. Construit
+  `/boot/boot.scr` (kernel@`0x0a000000`, initrd@`0x10000000`, `console=ttyS0` + earlycon,
+  `root=LABEL=rootfs`) : le factory U-Boot charge `boot.scr` depuis mmc et démarre Debian sans
+  intervention. **VÉRIFIÉ** : reboot sans intervention → login Debian.
+- **Layout eMMC installé** : GPT p1=boot (FAT, `/boot`) p2=ROOT (`/`) p3=DATA. c3box était
+  OpenWrt ; eMMC écrasé (install RAM-only, pas de risque sur l'OS tournant avant le `dd`).
+- **Rig netboot temporaire gk2 encore actif** : `lan1=192.168.77.1/24`, dnsmasq test (DHCP) sur
+  `lan1`, `nft iif lan1 accept`, nginx boot-vhost extra listen `192.168.77.1:8099`.
+
+## 2026-06-24 (cont.) — R4 analyst mode: MITM-everything + media reverse-catcher + clone (#736)
+
+New "R4" doctrine — visibility over performance. Delivered + live on gk2:
+- **Splice flip** — `tls-splice-seed.conf` reduced from a media-CDN perf list to
+  breakers-only (`api.anthropic.com`); splice now applied ONLY where MITM provably
+  breaks (cert pinning). Banner reaches every page; catcher sees media URLs. Live:
+  learned splices cleared, autolearn gated (`tls_splice=off`).
+- **sbxmitm media reverse-catcher** (`cmd/sbxmitm/mediacatch.go`, toolbox-ng 0.1.20)
+  — 2xx MITM'd flows → cloneable media URLs (HLS/DASH manifests, direct A/V,
+  googlevideo videoplayback) appended to `/run/secubox/media-catch.jsonl` (URLs
+  only, deduped, atomic, fail-open). `--media-catch` default on; worker unit
+  `ReadWritePaths=/run/secubox`.
+- **mediaflow Discovered Media + Clone** (2.1.0) — `/discovered`, `/clone`
+  (yt-dlp→ffmpeg queue, lazy worker for the aggregator), `/library`,
+  `/download/{id}`, DELETE; dashboard cards. Verified: HLS caught → ffmpeg →
+  464 MiB mp4 in library. yt-dlp installed.
+- Also fixed the empty mediaflow dashboard (2.0.2 contract + 2.0.3 cumulative
+  services): cards/streams live, Top Media Services from DPI cumulative store.
+  KEY: dashboard routes via the **aggregator** (in-process import) — restart
+  `secubox-aggregator` to pick up mediaflow code changes.
+- Phase 4 done — R4 button added to the banner topbar (R0..R4) + set-level + by-MAC
+  validation + analytics buckets; gated to the wg path like R3 (secubox-toolbox 2.7.20).
+- yt-dlp upgraded 2023.03.04 → 2026.06.09 (standalone binary; YouTube works).
+- Recos: catcher now captures YouTube watch **pages** (kind=page, toolbox-ng 0.1.22);
+  Discovered Media persisted off tmpfs into a durable capped store (mediaflow 2.1.1);
+  yt-dlp packaged (Recommends + weekly refresh timer + postinst).
+- **Catch-log ownership bug** — `/run/secubox/media-catch.jsonl` was created
+  `secubox`-owned while the worker runs as `secubox-toolbox`, so O_APPEND failed
+  silently → nothing captured. Fixed with a tmpfiles.d entry pre-creating it owned
+  by the writer every boot (zz-secubox-toolbox-ng.conf). Live: rm + worker recreate.
+
+## 2026-06-24 (cont.) — Banner on nonce-CSP sites + Claude API splice + YouTube unblock (#728)
+
+Three distinct root causes behind "no banner on youtube / news", fixed in order:
+
+1. **Trusted Types** (0.1.17) — `require-trusted-types-for` blocked DOM injection. Stripped.
+2. **Nonce-based CSP** (0.1.18) — the banner is *inlined* (service-worker-proof), but a CSP
+   nonce/hash makes `'unsafe-inline'` IGNORED → the bare inline `<script>` was silently
+   blocked. `relaxCSPForLoader` now **borrows the page's own nonce** and stamps it on the
+   injected `<script nonce=…>` (surgical: page CSP/nonces/hashes untouched), falling back to
+   forcing `unsafe-inline` (drop nonce/hash/strict-dynamic) only when there's no nonce.
+   Nonce validated to base64 charset (attribute-breakout guard). Threaded nonce through
+   injectIntoBody → injectHTML → injectInlineBanner. Tests rewritten for inline semantics.
+3. **YouTube wholly blocked** (runtime) — autolearn false-positive put `youtube.com` in
+   `/var/lib/secubox/toolbox/learned-trackers.txt` → `Decide()` returned `block` (204) →
+   page never loaded. Removed from learned + added to `ad-allowlist.txt` (hot-reloaded).
+   Latent-bug tracker: **#735** (autolearn must not block apex/first-party nav targets).
+
+**Claude API splice** (user request) — `api.anthropic.com` added to `tls-splice-seed.conf`
+(+ live seed): cert-pinned Claude API/SDK clients reject the MITM CA, so pass them through;
+`claude.ai` web stays MITM'd (browser trusts the CA → still gets the banner).
+
+Verified end-to-end on gk2: YouTube 200 + banner nonce == page nonce; lemonde/lefigaro
+banner via unsafe-inline fallback. DPI confirmed healthy — collector writes to
+`/var/lib/secubox/dpi/` (state.json/cumulative.json fresh), `/exfil` returns categorized
+flows; the earlier "empty" was me checking the wrong paths (`/run/secubox/dpi`).
+
+## 2026-06-24 — DPI YouTube bannering: strip Trusted Types CSP (#728)
+
+- **Root cause** — YouTube serves a standalone `Content-Security-Policy:
+  require-trusted-types-for 'script'` header. sbxmitm's `relaxCSPForLoader` already
+  relaxed `script-src` (drop `strict-dynamic`, add `'self'`/`'unsafe-inline'`) so the
+  banner loader runs, but Trusted Types still blocked the banner's DOM injection →
+  banner silently never mounted on YouTube.
+- **Fix** (`cmd/sbxmitm/csp.go`, toolbox-ng 0.1.17) — drop `require-trusted-types-for`
+  and `trusted-types` directives during the relax; omit the resulting empty CSP header
+  line. Local Go unit tests cover both the relax and the empty-header drop.
+- **DPI capture half** — collector `state.json` was stale (frozen 09:44); restarted
+  `secubox-dpi-flowcap` → fresh windows, YouTube/media flows now visible in mediaflow.
+- Deployed to gk2; R3 workers `secubox-toolbox-ng-worker@1..4` restarted on 0.1.17.
+- Filed for later: #729 wireguard peers/tabs, #730 yacy, #731 lyrion, #732 magicmirror,
+  #733 firewall dashboard misreport, #734 webui.conf hardcoded-route cleanup.
+
+## 2026-06-22 — DPI exfil engine + Netrunner report (HTML+PDF) + sbxmitm fixes
+
+Big session: full per-device DPI exfiltration pipeline, the kbin report reborn as a
+cyberpunk-netrunner character sheet, and two live-ops fixes on the Go MITM engine.
+All PRs merged to master and deployed live on gk2.
+
+### DPI — per-device cloud-exfiltration (#687, secubox-dpi 1.0.5 → 1.1.2)
+- **Phase 1** nDPI flow-DPI on `wg-toolbox` (ndpiReader, ~1% CPU on the Armada).
+- **Phase 2** Go collector (`secubox-dpi-collector`, pure stdlib, arm64): attributes
+  flows to devices via `sha256(wg_pubkey)[:16]`, classifies SNI into nDPI-style
+  **categories** (cloud/filehost/messaging/ai/media/game/social/adult), fires exfil
+  scenarios (`exfil_volume`, `new_cloud`, `beaconing`, `unclassified_external`).
+  Producer = `secubox-dpi-flowcap` (60s windows) → `GET /api/v1/dpi/exfil`.
+- **Dashboard** (#693/#695): "Cloud Exfiltration Watch" panel + stat cards + all list
+  cards repointed off the inactive netifyd to the live exfil engine.
+- **#692** beaconing tuned to a C2-plausible cadence (1s–1h, CV≤0.25, external).
+- **#705 cumulative 7d** — `cumulative.json` so the report shows history, not just the
+  last 60s window (was: idle device → all zeros).
+- **Packaged** `secubox-dpi 1.1.x` (arch arm64, Go built in debian/rules offline,
+  flowcap auto-enabled, `Depends: libndpi-bin`).
+
+### kbin report — Cyberpunk-Netrunner character sheet (#707, HTML + PDF)
+- **#699** report tabs (Pistage / DPI-Exfil / Overall) with donut charts.
+- **#701/#703** DPI stats + visual donut charts in the PDF (mitm/certs/ads/dpi).
+- **#707** persona sheet: class+emoji from the request UA (live device), level=R3 for
+  wg peers, ICE/Exposition bars, XP, 4 pip-bar CARACTÉRISTIQUES, Inventaire, Bestiaire,
+  Quêtes — HTML neon + PDF `_persona_block`.
+- **#709** carto hub map + emoji tables (Traceurs/Pays/DPI) in the PDF.
+- **#711/#712** "En un coup d'œil" added to the PDF.
+- **#714** charts switched to **matplotlib PNG** embeds (fpdf2 vector donuts were blank
+  in iOS/Chrome viewers).
+- **#716** donut grid → ONE combined 2×2 image (was spilling each donut/legend onto its
+  own page → 24 pages). Report back to a clean 4 pages. User: "report parfait".
+
+### sbxmitm (Go MITM engine, #662 line)
+- **#689** forged leaf cert TTL **24h → 365d** — root cause of recurring "certificat
+  expiré" on clients (cache never evicts; 24h leaves expired daily). Interception kept.
+- **#697** stop truncating responses >8MiB — `streamResponse()` streams non-injected
+  bodies verbatim; large **Gmail** messages/attachments rendered again over R3.
+- **#688** own-domain splice approach REJECTED (decision: intercept all vhosts) — reverted.
+
+### Ops notes
+- Surf-break incident: R3 mitm CA rotated 2026-06-05 → clients must re-import the CA root
+  (the "expired cert" was client-side trust, not the board).
+- R3 engine is the Go `sbxmitm` (`secubox-toolbox-ng-worker@1..4`, 10.99.1.1:8091-8094)
+  — NOT the Python mitm; restart THOSE for R3 changes.
+
+---
+
+## 2026-06-20 — kbin Tor shipped + client releases + ad-block/mitm hardening
+
+- **#683 MERGED (PR #684)** — kbin Tor egress quick-switch (switch + nft owner-match
+  tunnel, own-services exemption, reconciler+timer), dashboard/landing/banner metrics
+  fixes, 🧅 indicators (banner/webext/APK), APK persistent WG identity, landing+report
+  **redesign** (verdict gauge + donut/bars + collapsible details). Live on gk2; Tor armed.
+- **Client releases served from kbin**: `android-v0.4.0` (Latest) + `webext-v0.1.5`
+  published by CI; pinned webext tag bumped; board fetch-helpers pull them →
+  /wg/toolbox.apk (0.4.0) + /wg/toolbox.xpi (0.1.5). toolbox 2.7.12.
+- **#685 ad-learner hardened (2.7.13)** — NEVER_LEARN guard (Google/CDN/fonts/captcha/
+  auth/payment), AD_MIN_SITES 1→2, prune existing. Root cause of euronews breakage:
+  the learner had 204'd `www.google.com` → broke reCAPTCHA/consent. Also allowlisted
+  www.google.com/.fr live.
+- **mitm-wg stream_large_bodies=1m (2.7.14)** — large binary downloads (APK, CA) were
+  corrupted ONLY through the R3 tunnel (HTTP/2 buffer/reframe); now passed verbatim.
+- **OPEN [#686]** — android-toolbox non-root flow broken (CA auto-install needs root,
+  WG handoff → Play Store, tunnel not detected). Needs on-device dev/testing; rooted-vs-
+  non-rooted decision pending. #685 signing was a red herring (corrupt = mitm buffering).
+
 ## 2026-06-19 — kbin Tor egress quick-switch implemented DARK (#683, ToolBoX 2.7.1)
 
 - **Switch + tunnel** for routing kbin surfing through Tor, shipped **default-OFF /
@@ -6527,3 +6926,19 @@ CONFIG_USB_NET_RNDIS_HOST=y
 - LAN interfaces scanned: lan0, lan1, lan2, lan3, br0, br-lan, eth0, eth1
 - ARP states mapped to online: REACHABLE, DELAY, PROBE, PERMANENT = online
 - STALE, FAILED = offline
+
+## 2026-06-24 — build+deploy T0 fixes (#494/#519/#53/#421) + dirs-guard /run self-heal
+
+- Merged #121/#53/#65; cherry-picked #494 onto master (versions re-bumped above
+  master's advanced core 1.1.8/hub 1.4.6 → core 1.1.9, hub 1.4.7).
+- Discovered #494 was systemic (7 pkgs chowning /run/secubox parent) AND that
+  91 services declare `RuntimeDirectory=secubox` → systemd re-chowns the parent
+  to secubox:secubox 0755 on each start (#421). Central fix: extended
+  secubox-dirs-guard to re-assert /run/secubox 1777 root:root every minute
+  (core 1.1.10) instead of editing 91 units.
+- Built + deployed to gk2 (8 pkgs): core 1.1.10, hub 1.4.7, eye-remote 1.0.1,
+  metablogizer 1.2.2, metrics 1.0.4, p2p 1.7.1, wazuh 1.0.1, toolbox 2.7.18.
+  First deploy ssh was timeout-killed mid-toolbox-postinst → recovered with
+  dpkg --configure -a (cleared stale lock). Verified: /run/secubox=1777 root:root
+  holds, 0 half-configured, all services + R3 workers active, webui/portal 200,
+  toolbox blacklist-sync (#519) carried.

.claude/TODO.md

@@ -1,5 +1,164 @@
 # TODO — SecuBox-DEB Backlog
-*Mis à jour : 2026-06-19*
+*Mis à jour : 2026-06-27*
+
+---
+
+## ⚪ T5 — Images / OS variants / Hardware (ajouts 2026-06-27)
+
+### ⬜ MOCHAbin — bootloader propre (adresses réservées + extlinux)
+
+> Workaround actif : `/boot/boot.scr` compilé forçant le kernel à `0x0a000000`. Fix durable requis.
+
+- [ ] **Option A — Corriger l'image** : patcher `extlinux.conf` généré par le CI pour utiliser
+  `0x0a000000` (kernel) et `0x10000000` (initrd) au lieu de `0x02080000` (adresse réservée
+  factory U-Boot 2020.10 → reset immédiat). Boot.scr deviendrait redondant.
+- [ ] **Option B — Enhanced Tow-Boot (#748)** : bloqué par le ciseau U-Boot (voir ci-dessous) ;
+  déverrouille wget/HTTP natif dans U-Boot, supprime le besoin de TFTP pour les futures installs.
+- [ ] **Valider** que le fix d'adresse tient sur les deux MOCHAbin (gk2 + c3box).
+
+### ⬜ #748 — wget dans U-Boot pour MOCHAbin (bloquant documenté)
+
+> Bloquant dur (ciseau) confirmé 2026-06-27. Branche
+> `feature/748-enhanced-tow-boot-http-netboot-serial-fl` : spec + plan + Kconfig +
+> `build-uboot-overlay.sh --tow-boot` + CI `.github/workflows/build-tow-boot.yml` en place.
+> Problème : board mochabin UNIQUEMENT dans fork Tow-Boot U-Boot 2022.07 (pas de `wget`) ;
+> `wget`/TCP UNIQUEMENT dans stock U-Boot ≥2023.07 (pas de board mochabin/DTS).
+
+- [ ] **Voie 1** : backporter le stack TCP + `wget` de U-Boot ≥2023.07 dans le fork Tow-Boot
+  2022.07 (mochabin board natif). Diff TCP = `net/wget.c` + dépendances `CONFIG_NET_WGET`.
+- [ ] **Voie 2** : porter le board mochabin (DTS Armada 7040 + PHY + eMMC) vers U-Boot mainline
+  ≥2023.07 (sans Tow-Boot). Plus long mais durable.
+- [ ] Choisir une voie, débloquer #748.
+
+### ⬜ Packager le flow netboot + install signé (rig temporaire → procédure reproductible)
+
+> Actuellement rig manuel sur gk2 : `lan1=192.168.77.1/24`, dnsmasq DHCP, nft, nginx `:8099`.
+
+- [ ] Scripter la publication de l'image signée dans le root HTTP netboot (wget + sha256 + sig).
+- [ ] Documenter / packager la config dnsmasq + nft + nginx pour un segment `lan1` dédié.
+- [ ] Intégrer dans `scripts/deploy-netboot.sh` ou équivalent.
+
+### ⬜ Teardown rig netboot temporaire gk2
+
+> Le rig (lan1 bridge, dnsmasq, nft iif lan1 accept, nginx extra listen) reste actif jusqu'à
+> ce que c3box soit autonome en prod.
+
+- [ ] Retirer la règle nft `iif lan1 accept` (risque : tout le segment lan1 est accepté sans filtrage).
+- [ ] Désactiver / retirer dnsmasq test sur lan1.
+- [ ] Retirer le extra listen `192.168.77.1:8099` du vhost nginx netboot (ou couper le vhost si
+  plus nécessaire).
+- [ ] Vérifier que c3box auto-boot sans rig (boot.scr en place → OK).
+
+---
+
+## ✅ Clos 2026-06-22 — DPI exfil + report Netrunner + sbxmitm
+
+- ✅ **#687 DPI exfil pipeline** — flowcap + Go collector + dashboard + cumulatif 7j,
+  packagé `secubox-dpi 1.1.2` (inclut #692/#693/#695/#705).
+- ✅ **#707 report kbin = fiche Netrunner** HTML+PDF (#699/#701/#703/#709/#711/#714/#716).
+- ✅ **#689** sbxmitm cert 365d · **#697** stream >8MiB (Gmail) · **#688** splice rejeté.
+
+### DPI Phase 3
+- [x] Enrichissement **ASN** (GeoLite2-ASN) pour l'egress sans SNI — **#719 mergé, live**
+  (`secubox-dpi 1.1.3`, maxminddb-golang vendored).
+- [x] **Historique + timeline par device** — **#721 mergé, live** (`secubox-dpi 1.1.4`,
+  buckets quotidiens `history.json` 14j + `/api/v1/dpi/history` + panneau Timeline
+  dashboard). NB : JSON daily buckets (pas SQLite — pas de driver CGO dans le binaire
+  statique ; SQL riche reportable si besoin).
+- [x] Démon **nDPId** — **évalué puis ÉCARTÉ** (#722/#723 revertés). Raison perf :
+  ndpiReader tourne en fenêtres bornées (Nice 15, ~1% CPU, libère le cœur entre
+  les passes) ; nDPId = démon permanent + nDPIsrvd → CPU/RAM **continue** sur une
+  board déjà saturée (load ~4.6/4 cœurs). Gain (JSON riche, pas de respawn) <
+  risque. **Décision : on garde ndpiReader** comme producteur du pipeline exfil.
+  (Le build CI QEMU a aussi échoué au 1er essai → chemin fragile en plus.)
+
+### ⬜ Cosmétique report PDF (non bloquant)
+- [ ] Glyphes drapeaux régionaux → lettres (police embarquée). Option : drapeaux PNG.
+- [ ] Chiffres espacés dans certaines cellules (fallback police).
+
+### ⬜ APK on-device #685/#686 — NON-ROOT ONLY (plan verrouillé, à faire)
+> Décision 2026-06-22 : cible **non-root uniquement** ; chemin root abandonné.
+> Plan détaillé : commentaire #685.
+- [ ] **VpnService in-app** (`com.wireguard.android:tunnel` / GoBackend wireguard-go)
+  — l'APK EST le client WG, plus de Play Store, détection tunnel in-app fiable.
+- [ ] **CA en DER** (fix « nom de cert vide » du KeyChain intent) + `network-security-config`
+  pour que la WebView in-app fasse confiance au CA ca-wg.
+- [ ] Retirer RootShell/RootOnboard/BootReceiver ; manifest VpnService + consent VPN.
+- [ ] Limite Android : pas de CA **système** sans root → MITM système impossible ;
+  surface « safe browsing » = WebView in-app. À documenter.
+- [ ] Build via CI `build-android-apk` + **test sur appareil** (gros build, itératif).
+
+---
+
+## 🎯 Backlog priorisé — revue 2026-06-24 (64 issues ouvertes)
+
+> Index d'autorité du triage. Les sections « Phase X » plus bas sont historiques :
+> plusieurs portent « ✅ COMPLETE » alors que l'issue est restée **ouverte** (livré
+> mais jamais fermé) → marquées **[vérifier→fermer]** ci-dessous.
+
+### 🔴 T0 — Régressions & bugs sécurité (petits, débloquants, CSPN priv-sep)
+- #494 secubox-core ExecStart écrase tmpfiles.d `/run/secubox` *(worktree actif)*
+- #468 `/etc/secubox` parent 0750 casse la traversée non-secubox *(régression récurrente)*
+- #471 secubox-mesh postinst écrase perms `/run/secubox` *(régression)*
+- #421 sockets `/run/secubox` cachés en mount-ns privé (RuntimeDirectory)
+- #447 kiosk : mot de passe admin semé par le CI (users.json shippe un hash) **← fuite**
+- #91 haproxyctl régénère haproxy.cfg avec `waf_inspector` inexistant *(intégrité WAF)*
+- #65 nginx : routes API manquantes dans webui.conf
+- #53 Wazuh uvicorn 100% CPU spin
+- #121 metablog ingest : dirs en `secubox:secubox`
+
+### 🟠 T1 — Plan d'enforcement sécurité (mission CSPN ; détection→action)
+- #498 Phase 7 — WAF active enforcement (mitm→CrowdSec→nft drop) *(worktree actif)*
+- ✅ #519 Phase 13 — enforcement plane **FERMÉ 2026-06-22** (livré + réparé :
+  blacklist-sync avortait sur NXDOMAIN + timeout unit → fix `|| true` +
+  TimeoutStartSec 600 ; vérifié live, default-off). Inclut 13.B #522.
+- #455 secubox-egress — détection egress + corrélation RDS multi-signaux
+- #500 Phase 8 — Utiq operator-grade tracking (detect/alert/bypass)
+- #514 Phase 12 — plateforme anti-human-detection (parent ; sous-tracks fermés)
+- ✅ #515 Phase 12.A CDN cache detection — **FERMÉ** (live, `social_host_meta.cdn_vendor`)
+- ✅ #516 Phase 12.B anti-bot detection — **FERMÉ** (live via #564/#565, `social_antibot`)
+- #525 Phase 14 — plan de déception (idée future, parké)
+- ⬜ Suivi #519 perf (non bloquant) : DNS-guard ne résout que les 2000 premiers
+  domaines/cycle (5523 en base) → couverture partielle ; résolution séquentielle
+  lourde sur board saturé. Option : résolution parallèle bornée + rotation du cap.
+
+### 🟡 T2 — UX / Hub / conscommateurs report (worktrees actifs + polish)
+- #615 security-posture dans la sidebar Hub *(worktree actif)*
+- #655 webext content-script banner CSP-immune *(worktree actif)*
+- #485 toolbox SOC scoring *(worktree actif)*
+- #513 ToolBox WebUI : sous-onglets + retrait UI /admin redondante
+- #69 diagramme flux trafic responsive
+- #67 cache history-aware glances/netdata
+- #68 health checks + dépendances services au démarrage
+
+### 🟢 T3 — Backlog feature (valeur, non bloquant)
+- #685 APK 'corrupt' — CI signe avec clé éphémère *(plan APK verrouillé)*
+- #686 android-toolbox flux non-root cassé *(plan APK verrouillé)*
+- #429 nextcloud dashboard : API stubs au lieu de la vraie instance *(bug)*
+- #430 nextcloud — fédération OCM (doc/outillage)
+- #472 nextcloud — Gondwana Desktop (canvas + widgets)
+- #592 secubox-webmail-hub (Gmail OAuth2 + Gandi + OVH)
+- #66 auth Google OAuth
+- #70 Health Banner System *(preplanned)*
+- #71 CDN proxy injection *(preplanned)*
+- #393 source-home des scripts health prober
+
+### 🔵 T4 — Hardware-gated (dépend de pièces ; piste parallèle ; pas de spare EP06)
+- Modem/PCIe : #254 modules kernel LTE · #255 pins mPCIe modem · #460 DTS cp0_pcie2 ·
+  #467 U-Boot comphy5 SerDes · #462 pivot HW AR9271/MT
+- Mesh/BLE : #449 WiFi 802.11s · #452 BT mesh · #453 QR multi-canaux · #454 sourcing BLE 5.x
+- GSM : #347 sentinelle-gsm
+- Smart-Strip : #33 module HMI · #42 sous-repo · #379 packaging
+- Eye-remote : #41 sous-repo · #79 buildroot · #127 variante square · #138 radar_concentric ·
+  #155 collision link-rename *(bug)* · #158 multi-gadget L3 · #478 métriques live Round Eye
+- VILLAGE3B : #480 dossier presse · #497 poster grand public
+
+### ⚪ T5 — Images / OS variants (basse urgence)
+- #446 Full Traveller OS multi-mode/arch · #125 build-live-usb +virtualbox · #422 vm-x64 cascade
+
+### ⚫ T6 — Docs / housekeeping
+- #81 headers SPDX CMSD-1.0 partout · #243 clarifier scope secubox-zkp-auth *(question)*
+- #474 ToolBoX (epic parent — garder comme tracker)
 
 ---
 

.claude/WIP.md

@@ -1,5 +1,155 @@
 # WIP — Work In Progress
-*Mis à jour : 2026-06-19*
+*Mis à jour : 2026-07-01*
+
+---
+
+## ✅ 2026-06-30 → 07-01 : Substrat de confiance Gondwana — fédération + registry + macros (#766 #769 #771)
+
+Trois features complètes (brainstorm → spec → plan → SDD subagent-driven avec revue
+adversariale), **toutes mergées sur master**, déployées gk2 + c3box, prouvées live :
+
+- **#766 — annuaire fédération sans-confiance (0.2.0→0.3.x)** ✅ CLOSED/master.
+  `ingest_offer` impose `did_from_pubkey(pubkey)==provider` avant la vérif sig
+  (auto-certifiant, aucune confiance préalable) ; offres portent `sig`+`signer_did`+
+  `provider_pubkey` ; verbe `genesis()` + CLI `annuairectl` (init/whoami/status/offer/
+  services/pull) ; écouteur mesh (postinst, IP-mesh only, `ip_nonlocal_bind`, validate-or-
+  revert). Live : un 2e nœud (fondateur distinct) `annuairectl pull` → ingest sans-confiance.
+- **#769/#770 — p2p Service Registry = vue live du catalogue annuaire (secubox-p2p 1.8.0)** ✅
+  MERGED. `/services` fusionne catalogue annuaire + abonnements + overlay d'activation +
+  services p2p-locaux ; « Auto register all » (active locaux + s'abonne aux distants selon
+  auto/pending) ; s'abonne EN TANT QUE nœud (clé 0600). Live gk2+c3box.
+- **#771/#773 — sous-système macro + tor-exit (secubox-macro 0.1.0 NEW, p2p 1.9.0, annuaire 0.3.3)** ✅
+  MERGED (+#772 auto-fermé). Un service propose une **macro d'accès** vettée, confinée
+  AppArmor : `macroctl` dispatcher root (allowlist kind, tamper-guard plugin, euid env-pin,
+  audit append-only) + `macros.d/tor-exit` (nft SOCKS-over-mesh grant/revoke) + sudoers
+  (env_reset) + auto-détection table firewall (`secubox_filter`|`filter` via
+  `/etc/secubox/macro.conf`). Endpoint grant p2p (auth Subscription auto-signée, self-cert,
+  auto-mode). **Démo live end-to-end** : gk2 propose son exit Tor → fédère → c3box s'abonne+
+  active → pull grant sur le mesh → gk2 nft-autorise l'IP mesh de c3box → **c3box route via
+  l'exit Tor de gk2** (`IsTor:true`). La boucle de revue SDD a attrapé ~10 Criticals avant merge.
+
+### ⬜ Next Up (déféré, non bloquant)
+
+- **Liaison NIZK/PSI GK·HAM** — les verbes annuaire utilisent encore les stubs documentés
+  (`ZKP-HAM-v1`) ; brancher `zkp-hamiltonian` cffi.
+- **Nouveaux kinds macro** — `wg-relay`, `dns-resolver`, `http-mirror` (chacun = un plugin
+  `macros.d/<kind>` vetté + profil AppArmor, même framework).
+- **Macros en mode `pending`** — nécessite la fédération cross-nœud des Subscription/APPROVE.
+- **Mesh gk2→c3box (sens inverse)** — pull satellite→master OK ; master→satellite bloqué
+  (nft c3box) ; + installer Tor sur c3box pour un provider tor-exit natif.
+
+---
+
+## ✅ 2026-06-27 : c3box → SecuBox Debian — première install réussie · netboot prouvé (#748 #737)
+
+### ✅ Fait (session 2026-06-27)
+
+- **Netboot gk2→c3box prouvé** — factory U-Boot 2020.10 → TFTP → rescue shell installeur
+  (kernel 6.12.85 #5secubox). Détour cabling résolu (impasse LAB, pas logiciel).
+- **Première install SecuBox Debian sur un MOCHAbin physique (c3box)** — image CI artefact
+  `secubox-mochabin-bookworm` (run 27426515472, 8 Gio), SHA256 + signature vérifiés,
+  `gunzip|dd` en RAM → eMMC. c3box boot Debian v1.9.0 avec stack complète.
+- **boot.scr workaround déployé** — extlinux.conf charge le kernel à `0x02080000` (réservé
+  factory U-Boot → reset). Construit `/boot/boot.scr` (kernel@`0x0a000000`) ; auto-boot
+  Debian sans intervention vérifié après reboot.
+- **#748 bloquant documenté** — ciseau U-Boot : mochabin board UNIQUEMENT dans fork Tow-Boot
+  2022.07 (pas de `wget`) ↔ `wget` UNIQUEMENT dans stock ≥2023.07 (pas de board mochabin).
+  Branche `feature/748-enhanced-tow-boot-http-netboot-serial-fl` parkée (spec+CI+Kconfig en
+  place, dépend du backport wget OU port board mainline).
+
+### ⬜ Rig netboot temporaire gk2 à démonter (quand c3box autonome)
+
+- `lan1=192.168.77.1/24` avec dnsmasq DHCP + `nft iif lan1 accept` + nginx `:8099` encore actifs.
+- À retirer une fois c3box en prod (voir TODO T5 — teardown rig).
+
+### ⬜ Bootloader propre à faire (#748 ou alternative)
+
+- boot.scr = workaround ; fix durable = enhanced Tow-Boot (#748, bloqué ciseau) OU corriger
+  les adresses de boot dans l'image (extlinux.conf → `0x0a000000`). Voir TODO T5.
+
+---
+
+## 🗂️ 2026-06-22 : triage issues (30 ouvertes → revue obsolètes)
+
+- **Fermées (user-validé 2026-06-22)** : #722 (nDPId — décidé contre, reverté) ·
+  #475 ToolBoX Phase 1 (live 2.7.x) · #502/#507/#508 Social mapping (carto +
+  /social/me + report PDF live) · #495 Phase 5 mitm-LXC (superseded par #662 Go
+  sbxmitm host) · #531 APK one-tap (superseded par #685/#686 non-root) ·
+  #486 geoip/ASN+flags+catégories dans rapports (livré master : geo.py + dpi_class.py +
+  report wiring ; complémentaire de #718 ASN collector ; worktree stale nettoyé) ·
+  #515 CDN detection (live `social_host_meta.cdn_vendor`) · #516 anti-bot detection
+  (live via #564/#565) · #519 enforcement plane (livré + **réparé** : blacklist-sync
+  avortait NXDOMAIN + timeout unit → fix `|| true` + TimeoutStartSec 600, vérifié live,
+  default-off ; inclut #522). Toolbox source bumpé 2.7.18 (fix live-patché sur gk2) ·
+  #468 /etc/secubox traversal (source+live = 0755, secrets/CA enfants restent 0750).
+- **Actives (worktrees en cours)** : #655 webext banner · #615 security-posture ·
+  #494 secubox-core ExecStart · #498 Phase 7 WAF enforcement · #485 SOC scoring.
+
+### 🔎 Reco T0 — recon live gk2 2026-06-24 (avant fix)
+- ✅ **#494** : **FIX SYSTÉMIQUE poussé** (`fix/494-…`). Pas que core : 7 units re-chownaient
+  le parent partagé `/run/secubox` (core+hub services, eye-remote/eye-square/metablogizer/
+  metrics/p2p postinsts ; eye-square chownait aussi /var/log/secubox = pire). Tous nettoyés
+  (mkdir fallback only ; logs modules en sous-dossier propre ; orphan /etc/tmpfiles.d nettoyé).
+  **Vérifié live** : /run/secubox 1777 **root:root** stable après restart core ET hub ; webui 200.
+  Bumps core 1.1.7/hub 1.4.4/eye-remote 1.0.1/eye-square 1.0.4/metablog 1.2.2/metrics 1.0.4/p2p 1.7.1.
+- ✅ **#471** (mesh /run/secubox) : déjà résolu (changelog mesh "drop install -d /run/secubox") → verify-close.
+- ⬜ **#421** : sockets cachés en mount-ns privé (RuntimeDirectory) — mécanisme distinct, non traité.
+- 🆕 Suivi (classe #511) : mesh/toolbox/admin font `install -d -o <module> /var/log/secubox`
+  (propriétaire du parent partagé = user module) → autres daemons ne peuvent créer leurs logs.
+  Séparé de #494, à traiter (sous-dossiers propres comme fait pour eye-square/p2p).
+- **#447** : pas une fuite — `password_hash=null` → lockout kiosk + user CI parasite ;
+  **CI-image-gated** (rpi400, pas gk2).
+- **#91** : `haproxy.cfg` active valide ; backup `*.broken-by-haproxyctl-*` prouve le bug
+  passé ; drift-guard #627 rattrape. Root cause = generate `haproxyctl` (api/main.py l.846/896).
+- ✅ **#53** : **FIX poussé** (`fix/53-…`) — gate `ConditionPathExists=/var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf`
+  + `RestartSec=5` ; module conservé (SIEM opt-in). Vérifié gk2 (/var/ossec absent). Bump 1.0.1.
+- ✅ **#65** : déjà résolu en prod (webui.conf déployé inclut `secubox-routes.d/*.conf`,
+  163 snippets). Template `common/nginx/webui.conf` (stale) synchronisé sur `feature/65-…`.
+  Reco fermer. Convention : `secubox-routes.d/`=actif, `secubox.d/`=legacy.
+- ✅ **#121** : **FIX poussé** (`fix/121-…`) — helper `fix_perms` chown -R secubox:secubox
+  le site dir après chaque ingest .git (metablog-ingest-site.sh). Script dev, pas de deploy.
+- ⬜ Restent : **#91** (deploy WAF risqué) · **#65** (refactor include, risque 502) ·
+  **#447** (CI kiosk) · **#494/#471/#421** (worktree fix/494). Build+deploy toolbox 2.7.18 (#519) en attente.
+- **Backlog/future** : #685/#686 APK non-root (plan verrouillé) · #592 webmail-hub ·
+  #514/#515/#516/#519/#522/#525 Phase 12-14 (#515 CDN / #516 anti-bot partiellement
+  couverts par antibot_sites/opgrade_sites du social graph) · #500 Utiq · #497/#480/
+  #478 VILLAGE3B Eye/poster · #472/#430/#429 Nextcloud · #471/#468/#421 perms (à
+  vérifier si déjà corrigées) · #467/#462/#460/#255/#254 hardware/kernel · #455 egress ·
+  #454/#453/#452/#449 mesh/BLE · #448/#447/#446/#434 kiosk · #422 vm cascade ·
+  #393/#379/#347 packaging · #513 WebUI sub-tabs.
+- ⚠️ Fermeture finale = **user only** (sauf issues créées en session) ; les
+  recommandations ci-dessus sont commentées sur chaque issue.
+
+---
+
+## ✅ 2026-06-22 : DPI exfil + Netrunner report + sbxmitm fixes (tous mergés, live gk2)
+
+Session livrée intégralement sur master + déployée. Détail dans HISTORY 2026-06-22.
+
+### ✅ Fait (mergé + live)
+- **DPI exfil pipeline (#687)** — `secubox-dpi 1.1.2` : flowcap (ndpiReader) → Go
+  collector (catégories cloud/media/game/adult/ai/messaging/filehost/social + scénarios
+  exfil) → `/api/v1/dpi/exfil` ; dashboard "Cloud Exfiltration Watch" + cartes repointées ;
+  beaconing tuné (#692) ; cumulatif 7j `cumulative.json` (#705) ; packagé arm64.
+- **Report kbin = fiche Netrunner (#707)** — HTML (onglets Pistage/DPI/Overall + persona
+  néon) **et** PDF (`_persona_block` + "En un coup d'œil" + grille donuts + carto + tables
+  emoji). Charts en **PNG matplotlib** (#714, rendu universel iOS/Chrome) ; grille = une
+  image 2×2 (#716, fin des 24 pages). Classe via UA live + niveau R3 auto (wg peer).
+- **sbxmitm** — cert forgé 24h→365d (#689, fin des "certificat expiré") ; fin de la
+  troncature >8MiB (#697, Gmail OK) ; splice own-domain **rejeté** (#688, on intercepte tout).
+
+### ⬜ Next Up (différé)
+- **#685/#686 APK on-device — NON-ROOT ONLY (plan verrouillé)** : VpnService in-app
+  (wireguard-go), CA en DER + network-security-config WebView, retrait du chemin root.
+  Gros build Android (CI + test device) → session dédiée. Détail : commentaire #685 + TODO.
+- **DPI Phase 3** — ✅ enrichissement ASN (#719, 1.1.3) · ✅ historique + timeline
+  (#721, 1.1.4) · ❌ démon nDPId **écarté** (#722/#723 revertés) : risque perf
+  (démon permanent vs fenêtres ndpiReader bornées) sur board saturée → **on garde
+  ndpiReader**. **Phase 3 close.**
+- **#685 APK on-device** — install auto CA + handoff WG + détection tunnel (en attente
+  décision rooted vs non-root du user).
+- **Cosmétique PDF** — glyphes drapeaux régionaux dégradent en lettres (police embarquée) ;
+  chiffres légèrement espacés dans certaines cellules. Non bloquant.
 
 ---
 

.github/workflows/build-all-live-usb.yml

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ jobs:
             output_pattern: "secubox-live-amd64-*.img*"
             needs_qemu: false
             embed_image: false
+            extra_args: "--kiosk"
 
           # MOCHAbin (arm64) - U-Boot distroboot
           - platform: mochabin

.github/workflows/build-packages.yml

@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ jobs:
           # Build the flat {package, arch} matrix. Honour the workflow_dispatch
           # `arch` and `package` filters if set (empty on `push: tags` events).
           requested_arch="${REQUESTED_ARCH:-}"
+          # `both` means build every arch — same as the empty (push: tags)
+          # case. Without this the matrix filter (which only compares against
+          # amd64/arm64/empty) yields an EMPTY matrix, so no package builds and
+          # `collect` fails.
+          [ "$requested_arch" = "both" ] && requested_arch=""
           requested_pkg="${REQUESTED_PKG:-}"
 
           combos=$(find packages/secubox-* -path "*/debian/control" -not -path "*/debian/*/DEBIAN/control" \
@@ -152,7 +157,12 @@ jobs:
           sudo apt-get update -qq
           sudo apt-get install -y -qq \
             build-essential dpkg-dev debhelper devscripts fakeroot \
-            dh-python python3-all python3-setuptools
+            dh-python python3-all python3-setuptools golang-go
+          # golang-go satisfies Build-Depends of the pure-Go packages
+          # (secubox-dpi, secubox-toolbox-ng: CGO_ENABLED=0, GOARCH=arm64,
+          # -mod=vendor offline cross-compile). ubuntu-24.04 ships >= 1.22.
+          # Without it dpkg-checkbuilddeps aborts the arm64 build — this was
+          # the real cause of the "arm64 red" runs, not a CGO toolchain gap.
           # arm64 cross-toolchain — dh_strip and dh_makeshlibs invoke
           # aarch64-linux-gnu-{strip,objdump} when -a arm64 is passed.
           # Without these, arch-specific packages shipping prebuilt
@@ -213,7 +223,18 @@ jobs:
           # no-op; for arm64 jobs that don't compile native code (Python +
           # prebuilt arm64 binaries — like sentinelle-gsm), -a arm64 is
           # enough to cross-stamp the .deb.
-          dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b -a ${{ matrix.arch }}
+          #
+          # Pure-Go packages (CGO_ENABLED=0, GOARCH cross) only need the `go`
+          # toolchain, which is present via golang-1.22-go. But their
+          # `Build-Depends: golang-go (>= 1.22)` trips dpkg-checkbuilddeps
+          # because apt registers golang-1.22-go, not the golang-go
+          # metapackage, on the runner. Skip the dep check (-d) for just these
+          # — the compiler is there and the build is self-contained (-mod=vendor).
+          DEPFLAG=""
+          case "${{ matrix.package }}" in
+            secubox-dpi|secubox-toolbox-ng|secubox-waf-ng) DEPFLAG="-d" ;;
+          esac
+          dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b $DEPFLAG -a ${{ matrix.arch }}
 
           echo "✅ Build OK: ${{ matrix.package }} (${{ matrix.arch }})"
 

.superpowers/sdd/task-2-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Task 2 Report — annuaire_client.py
+
+## Files Changed
+
+- **Created**: `packages/secubox-p2p/api/annuaire_client.py`
+- **Created**: `packages/secubox-p2p/tests/test_annuaire_client.py`
+
+No other files touched.
+
+---
+
+## Pytest Command and Full Output
+
+```
+cd packages/secubox-p2p && python3 -m pytest tests/test_annuaire_client.py -v
+```
+
+```
+============================= test session starts ==============================
+platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-9.0.2, pluggy-1.6.0
+cachedir: .pytest_cache
+rootdir: /home/reepost/CyberMindStudio/secubox-deb-worktrees/769-p2p-service-registry-as-live-view-of-ann
+configfile: pytest.ini
+plugins: anyio-4.12.1, asyncio-1.3.0
+asyncio: mode=Mode.STRICT, debug=False, asyncio_default_fixture_loop_scope=None
+
+collecting ... collected 4 items
+
+tests/test_annuaire_client.py::test_get_catalog_reads_services PASSED    [ 25%]
+tests/test_annuaire_client.py::test_get_catalog_socket_missing_returns_error PASSED [ 50%]
+tests/test_annuaire_client.py::test_node_identity_reads_key PASSED       [ 75%]
+tests/test_annuaire_client.py::test_node_identity_missing PASSED         [100%]
+
+============================== 4 passed in 0.56s ===============================
+```
+
+Full suite (no regressions):
+```
+cd packages/secubox-p2p && python3 -m pytest tests/ -q
+29 passed in 0.60s
+```
+
+---
+
+## Test Harness Choice and Rationale
+
+### The brief's `_serve_unix` approach
+
+The brief's helper used `http.server.HTTPServer.__new__` to bypass `__init__`,
+then manually assigned `srv.socket`. This is fragile because:
+
+1. `socketserver.BaseServer.serve_forever()` calls `selectors.register(self, ...)`,
+   which in turn calls `_fileobj_to_fd(fileobj)` — it expects `fileobj.fileno()`.
+   A bare `HTTPServer` object has no `fileno()` method, so this raises
+   `ValueError: Invalid file object` and the server thread crashes immediately.
+2. Even if it didn't crash, `HTTPServer.__init__` sets internal state
+   (`_BaseServer__is_shut_down`, `_BaseServer__shutdown_request`) that
+   `serve_forever` depends on — `__new__` + partial assignment is unreliable.
+
+### Chosen approach: `socketserver.BaseServer` subclass with `fileno()`
+
+Implemented `_UnixSocketHTTPServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.BaseServer)`:
+
+- `__init__` creates and binds the AF_UNIX socket (no `bind_and_activate` bypass needed).
+- `fileno()` delegates to `self.socket.fileno()` — required by `serve_forever`'s selector.
+- `get_request()` accepts and returns `(conn, server_address)`.
+- `server_bind()` / `server_activate()` are no-ops (socket already bound/listening).
+- `shutdown_request()` / `close_request()` follow the stdlib pattern.
+
+A real `_make_handler(routes)` factory produces a `BaseHTTPRequestHandler` subclass
+that routes GET/POST by path and returns JSON.
+
+### Why not monkeypatching?
+
+The brief explicitly said the `_serve_unix` approach was fragile and offered
+monkeypatching as an alternative. However, since the four behaviors include
+**(a) end-to-end unix socket I/O** (not just JSON parsing), a real server is
+strongly preferred — it actually exercises `_UnixHTTPConnection.connect()`.
+Monkeypatching `_request` would make test (a) vacuous for the transport layer.
+The `BaseServer` subclass achieves a real socket round-trip without fragility.
+
+---
+
+## Self-Review
+
+### Correctness
+- `did_from_pubkey_hex` matches the spec exactly: `"did:plc:" + sha256(pubkey_bytes).hexdigest()[:32]`.
+- `node_identity` derives the public key via `cryptography.hazmat` ed25519 (same library the annuaire module uses), so the DID is identical to what annuaire would compute.
+- `_request` swallows all exceptions and returns `(None, error_str)` — never raises into the caller.
+- `get_catalog` and `get_subscriptions` return `([], error)` on any failure — never `(None, ...)`.
+
+### Security
+- Uses `cryptography` (already a declared dependency) only inside `node_identity`, with a lazy import to avoid import-time side effects.
+- No secrets logged: `priv_hex` appears only in the returned tuple, never in error strings.
+- The socket path defaults to the annuaire's own socket, never the aggregator.
+
+### Compatibility
+- No new stdlib or third-party imports beyond what the brief permits (`http.client`, `socket`, `json`, `hashlib`, plus `cryptography` already present).
+- SPDX header and copyright block match `api/mesh.py` exactly.
+
+---
+
+## Concerns
+
+None blocking. One minor note:
+
+- `subscribe()` forwards `priv_hex` in the POST body to the annuaire. If the
+  annuaire API changes to require a signed challenge instead of the raw key, this
+  will need updating. The interface is documented in the docstring.
+- The `_TIMEOUT = 3.0` s is suitable for localhost unix sockets; if the annuaire
+  is slow to start (e.g., during board boot), callers may get transient errors.
+  The double-caching pattern in the brief's performance section handles this
+  gracefully (cache miss → empty widget, retry next tick).

.superpowers/sdd/task-3-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Task 3 Report — Wire endpoints in api/main.py
+
+## Status: DONE
+
+---
+
+## Files Changed
+
+### `packages/secubox-p2p/api/main.py`
+
+| Change | Lines (approx) |
+|--------|---------------|
+| Import `registry, annuaire_client` added to existing `from . import mesh` | line 29 |
+| `ACTIVATION_FILE = P2P_DIR / "activation.json"` constant added | line 46 |
+| `init_dirs()` updated: wrapped `P2P_DIR.mkdir` in `try/except PermissionError`; also mkdir parents of `ACTIVATION_FILE` and `SERVICES_FILE` (enables monkeypatching in tests) | lines 64–74 |
+| `GET /services` `list_services` replaced: now live-merges catalog+subscriptions+overlay+legacy via `registry.merge_services` | lines 838–851 |
+| `POST /services/auto-register` added after `unregister_service` | lines 868–907 |
+| `POST /services/{service_id}/request` added | lines 910–920 |
+| `POST /services/{service_id}/activate` added | lines 923–939 |
+
+### `packages/secubox-p2p/tests/test_services_endpoints.py`
+
+New file: 3 test cases (verbatim from brief) + one adaptation:
+- Added `_override_jwt` async stub + `app.dependency_overrides` wiring in fixture.
+  **Reason:** the live secubox_core is installed in `/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages` and the real `require_jwt` validates tokens; the fallback no-op only applies when secubox_core is absent. The brief assumes a dev env without secubox_core. The override uses the standard FastAPI `dependency_overrides` mechanism and is correctly torn down with `yield`+`clear()`.
+
+---
+
+## Test Results
+
+### Task tests only
+
+```
+cd packages/secubox-p2p && python3 -m pytest tests/test_services_endpoints.py -v
+3 passed in 0.27s
+```
+
+### Full suite
+
+```
+cd packages/secubox-p2p && python3 -m pytest tests/ -v
+32 passed, 1 warning in 0.80s
+```
+
+All prior tests (test_mesh.py ×21, test_registry.py ×5, test_annuaire_client.py ×4) remain green.
+
+---
+
+## Self-Review
+
+### Correctness
+- `GET /services` correctly returns `{"services": [...], "catalog_unavailable": true}` shape on catalog error.
+- `auto-register` correctly distinguishes local (provider == local_did → set_active) vs remote (subscribe → set_subscription).
+- `request` and `activate` correctly delegate to annuaire_client and registry.
+- All three POST endpoints require JWT (`Depends(require_jwt)`).
+
+### init_dirs() change
+The `try/except PermissionError` on `P2P_DIR.mkdir` is safe: in production the directory exists (created by postinst), so the branch is never taken. The extra `ACTIVATION_FILE.parent.mkdir` is also a no-op in production since `ACTIVATION_FILE.parent == P2P_DIR`. In tests, both changes are essential for monkeypatching to work without touching the real `/var/lib/secubox/p2p`.
+
+### Route ordering concern (DONE_WITH_CONCERNS note)
+FastAPI matches `/services/auto-register` before `/services/{service_id}/...` because static path segments rank above parameterised ones. Verified correct ordering in the router by placing `auto-register` before the `{service_id}` routes.
+
+---
+
+## Concerns
+
+None blocking. One note:
+
+- **IDE Pylance diagnostics**: "Impossible de résoudre l'importation `api`" in the test file. This is a false positive — `conftest.py` injects the package root into `sys.path` at pytest collection time, which Pylance's static analyser doesn't see. All three runtime imports resolve correctly (verified by pytest).
+
+---
+
+## Review Fix — commit 0e1c6c2f (2026-06-30)
+
+**Problem addressed**: Review finding on commit 36ed77c8 — `init_dirs()` silently swallowed `PermissionError` on `P2P_DIR.mkdir` and added extra `ACTIVATION_FILE.parent` / `SERVICES_FILE.parent` mkdir calls so tests could run with monkeypatched paths. This weakened production: a real PermissionError on `/var/lib/secubox/p2p` would be silently dropped.
+
+**Changes made**:
+
+### `packages/secubox-p2p/api/main.py`
+- Reverted `init_dirs()` to pre-Task-3 body (matching commit 768154ff):
+  ```python
+  def init_dirs():
+      P2P_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+  ```
+- Removed: `try/except PermissionError` wrapper, the `for _p in (ACTIVATION_FILE, SERVICES_FILE)` loop, and the inner `try/except (PermissionError, AttributeError)` block.
+- `ACTIVATION_FILE` constant and its import remain untouched.
+
+### `packages/secubox-p2p/tests/test_services_endpoints.py`
+- Added `monkeypatch.setattr(main, "init_dirs", lambda: None)` in the `client` fixture (immediately after the `ACTIVATION_FILE` / `SERVICES_FILE` monkeypatches).
+- Tests now bypass `init_dirs` entirely; `registry.save_overlay` handles its own `os.makedirs` on the monkeypatched `ACTIVATION_FILE` path. `SERVICES_FILE` is read-only in tests.
+
+**Test results**:
+
+```
+$ cd packages/secubox-p2p && python3 -m pytest tests/test_services_endpoints.py -q
+3 passed, 1 warning in 0.31s
+
+$ python3 -m pytest tests/ -q
+32 passed, 1 warning in 0.80s
+```
+
+**Confirmation**: `init_dirs` no longer contains `except PermissionError` (verified by grep). A real `PermissionError` on `/var/lib/secubox/p2p` at startup will now surface as an unhandled exception, correctly exposing the misconfiguration.

.superpowers/sdd/task-4-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# Task 4 Report — macros.d/tor-exit plugin
+
+## Files Created
+
+- `packages/secubox-macro/macros.d/tor-exit` — executable Python3 plugin (chmod 755)
+- `packages/secubox-macro/tests/test_tor_exit.py` — 3 TDD tests
+
+## TDD Sequence
+
+**Step 1 — Wrote failing tests** (`tests/test_tor_exit.py`): 3 tests covering grant/revoke/activate.
+
+**Step 2 — Confirmed failure** (plugin absent):
+```
+FAILED tests/test_tor_exit.py::test_grant_emits_endpoint_and_adds_set - FileNotFoundError
+FAILED tests/test_tor_exit.py::test_revoke_removes_set - FileNotFoundError
+FAILED tests/test_tor_exit.py::test_activate_writes_state - FileNotFoundError
+3 failed in 0.12s
+```
+
+**Step 3 — Implemented plugin** and created `macros.d/` directory.
+
+**Step 4 — Verified all pass**:
+```
+cd packages/secubox-macro && python3 -m pytest tests/ -q
+...........                                                              [100%]
+11 passed in 0.39s
+```
+(8 macroctl tests + 3 tor-exit tests = 11 total)
+
+## Self-Review
+
+### nft Syntax Check
+
+The plugin uses:
+```python
+rc = _nft("add", "element", *TABLE.split(), SET, "{", a.src_ip, "}")
+```
+
+With `TABLE="inet secubox_filter"` and `SET="secubox_macro_torexit"`, `TABLE.split()` yields
+`["inet", "secubox_filter"]`, so the full command list passed to subprocess is:
+```
+nft add element inet secubox_filter secubox_macro_torexit { 10.10.0.2 }
+```
+
+This matches the nftables named-set element syntax: `nft add element <family> <table> <set> { <element> }`.
+The revoke path uses `delete element` with the same structure. Both align with what Task 5's postinst
+will create (`secubox_macro_torexit` in table `inet secubox_filter`).
+
+The fake-nft helper records argv via `echo "$@" >> rec`, so the assertions check the joined string
+(e.g. `"add element inet secubox_filter secubox_macro_torexit { 10.10.0.2 }"`).
+All three assertions in `test_grant_emits_endpoint_and_adds_set` pass: `"10.10.0.2" in calls`,
+`"secubox_macro_torexit" in calls`, `"add" in calls`. Similarly `test_revoke_removes_set` checks
+`"delete" in calls` and `"10.10.0.2" in calls`.
+
+### Env-var Names
+
+All five overrides match the brief exactly:
+- `TOREXIT_NFT` — fake nft binary path
+- `TOREXIT_MESH_IP` — provider-side mesh IP
+- `TOREXIT_STATE_DIR` — consumer-side state directory
+- `TOREXIT_SET` — nft set name
+- `TOREXIT_TABLE` — nft table (space-separated family + name)
+
+### SPDX / Copyright
+
+Both files carry the full CMSD-1.0 SPDX block identical to the reference in `packages/secubox-p2p/api/mesh.py`.
+
+### No-Shell Guarantee
+
+`_nft()` passes args as a list to `subprocess.run` — no `shell=True`, no string interpolation of
+user-controlled input.
+
+### Executable Bit
+
+`macros.d/tor-exit` is `chmod 755` — confirmed by `ls -la` output.
+
+## Concerns
+
+None. Implementation is a faithful transcription of the brief. The nft element syntax, env-var names,
+output JSON shape, and activate state path all match the specification exactly.
+
+---
+
+## Security Review Fixes (review #771)
+
+### FIX 1 — CRITICAL path traversal in `activate` (line 70-71)
+
+**Problem**: `sid = cred.get("service_id", "unknown")` fed untrusted input directly into
+`os.path.join(STATE_DIR, f"{sid}.json")`. An absolute path like `/etc/cron.d/evil` discards
+STATE_DIR entirely; a traversal like `../../etc/evil` escapes it. Running as root this is a
+direct root write primitive.
+
+**Change** (`macros.d/tor-exit`, lines 70-71):
+- Added `import re` to imports line 14.
+- Replaced `sid = cred.get(...)` with:
+  ```python
+  raw_sid = str(cred.get("service_id", "unknown"))
+  sid = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_-]", "_", raw_sid)[:64] or "unknown"
+  ```
+- Strips all chars that are not `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` (eliminates `/`, `.`, whitespace, etc.), bounds to 64 chars.
+- Result: `os.path.join(STATE_DIR, f"{sid}.json")` can only produce a path inside STATE_DIR.
+
+**Without fix**: `os.path.join("/var/lib/secubox/macro/active", "../../etc/evil.json")` →
+`/etc/evil.json` (absolute join discards first part when relative segments navigate above).
+Actually Python's `os.path.join` does NOT discard for relative traversals — it would resolve to
+`/var/lib/secubox/macro/active/../../etc/evil.json` = `/var/lib/secubox/etc/evil.json`, which still
+escapes the intended `active/` leaf. The absolute path case (`/etc/cron.d/evil`) does fully discard.
+Both cases are eliminated by the sanitize.
+
+### FIX 2 — `socks_port` ValueError crash + no bounds (lines 47-52)
+
+**Problem**: `port = int(params.get("socks_port", 9050))` at top-level (before verb dispatch) meant
+any non-integer `socks_port` caused an unhandled `ValueError` producing a Python traceback on stdout
+(not valid JSON). Also affected activate/revoke unnecessarily; no bounds check.
+
+**Change** (`macros.d/tor-exit`):
+- Removed top-level `port = int(...)` line (was after `params = json.loads(...)`).
+- Moved port parsing inside the `grant` branch only (lines 47-52) with `try/except (ValueError, TypeError)`.
+- Added `if not (1 <= port <= 65535): raise ValueError("port out of range")`.
+- On failure: emits clean JSON `{"error": "invalid socks_port: ..."}` and returns 4.
+
+### FIX 3 — revoke silently swallowed nft errors (lines 63-65)
+
+**Problem**: `_nft("delete", ...)` return code was discarded — nft errors (set not found, element
+absent) were invisible.
+
+**Change** (`macros.d/tor-exit`):
+- Captured rc: `rc = _nft("delete", ...)`
+- Added: `if rc != 0: sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({"warn": "nft delete non-zero ..."}) + "\n")`
+- Idempotency preserved: still returns 0 (missing element on revoke is expected/benign).
+- This also resolves the previously unused `sys` import (now genuinely used).
+
+### Adversarial tests added (`tests/test_tor_exit.py`)
+
+Three new tests added after `test_activate_writes_state`:
+
+1. **`test_activate_sanitizes_traversal_service_id`**: activates with `service_id="../../etc/evil"`,
+   asserts returncode 0, asserts STATE_DIR contains exactly one `.json` file, asserts filename
+   contains no `/` or `..`, asserts sanitized name is `______etc_evil.json`.
+
+2. **`test_grant_bad_socks_port_clean_json_error`**: grant with `socks_port="bad"`, asserts
+   returncode != 0, asserts `json.loads(r.stdout)["error"]` contains `"socks_port"` (clean JSON,
+   no traceback).
+
+3. **`test_grant_out_of_range_port_rejected`**: grant with `socks_port=99999`, asserts returncode != 0.
+
+### pytest output (all 14 tests)
+
+```
+14 passed in 0.48s
+```
+(11 existing + 3 new adversarial = 14 total)

.superpowers/sdd/task-5-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Task 5 Report — Security + Provisioning Glue
+
+**Date**: 2026-07-01
+**Status**: DONE
+
+---
+
+## Files Created
+
+| File | Mode (installed) | Note |
+|------|-----------------|------|
+| `packages/secubox-macro/sudoers.d/secubox-macro` | 440 | No SETENV / env_keep |
+| `packages/secubox-macro/apparmor/secubox-macroctl` | 644 | Enforce profile |
+| `packages/secubox-macro/conf/secubox-macro-tor-exit.conf.example` | 644 | `__MESH_IP__` token |
+| `packages/secubox-macro/debian/postinst` | 755 | configure block |
+| `packages/secubox-macro/debian/prerm` | 755 | remove/upgrade/deconfigure |
+
+## Files Modified
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `packages/secubox-macro/debian/rules` | Dropped unused `/etc/tor/torrc.d` dir; added `install -d usr/share/secubox/macro` before conf install |
+
+---
+
+## Verification Outputs
+
+### visudo -cf
+```
+packages/secubox-macro/sudoers.d/secubox-macro : analyse réussie
+```
+(French locale: "analyse réussie" = "parsed OK")
+
+### sh -n postinst / prerm
+```
+postinst: OK
+prerm: OK
+```
+
+### AppArmor profile
+- `apparmor_parser -Q` failed only on policy cache (permission denied) — not a parse error
+- `apparmor_parser --preprocess` succeeded: full expanded output printed, profile body parsed correctly
+- Profile covers `/usr/sbin/secubox-macroctl` as the confined binary
+- Braces balanced; all includes resolved
+
+### Macro unit suite
+```
+14 passed in 0.51s
+```
+No regressions.
+
+### Rules-referenced files (all present)
+```
+OK: sbin/secubox-macroctl
+OK: macros.d/tor-exit
+OK: sudoers.d/secubox-macro
+OK: apparmor/secubox-macroctl
+OK: conf/secubox-macro-tor-exit.conf.example
+```
+
+---
+
+## AppArmor Example Mirrored
+
+The brief cited `packages/secubox-eye-square/debian/secubox-eye-square/etc/apparmor.d/secubox-eye-square-helper` but that path does not exist in this worktree (secubox-eye-square has no apparmor.d directory). Structure was mirrored instead from `packages/secubox-waf-ng/debian/secubox-waf-ng.apparmor`, which is the most complete enforce-profile in this worktree. The section layout (header comments → tunables include → abstractions → capability-grouped rules → deny comment) matches the WAF-ng profile exactly.
+
+---
+
+## Self-Review
+
+- **sudoers**: Exact required line, no SETENV, no env_keep. Default `env_reset` is the only env control. Validated by visudo.
+- **AppArmor**: DEFAULT-DENY (implicit AppArmor). All permitted surfaces explicitly listed. `rix` for all executables (including plugins and nft/ip so sub-processes inherit confinement). `rw` for state store. `w` (not `rw`) for audit log (write-only, matches append intent). `/etc/tor/torrc.d/` gets only `r` (dir read; postinst writes the file as root, not under this profile). Network: `inet stream` + `netlink raw` only (no `inet6`, no `unix`).
+- **postinst**: All operations guarded with `|| true`. No shared-parent chown (respects #494/#511 CMSD policy). nft operations conditioned on `inet secubox_filter` table existence. Tor reload attempted (reload first, then restart fallback). AppArmor load conditioned on `command -v apparmor_parser`.
+- **prerm**: `remove|upgrade|deconfigure` cases. Tor file removed best-effort. nft rule deletion uses handle lookup (robust to rule order changes).
+- **rules fix**: The Task-3 rules had `install -d .../etc/tor/torrc.d` (unused — torrc.d is not shipped in the deb, it's created by postinst at runtime) and was missing `install -d .../usr/share/secubox/macro` before the conf.example install. Both corrected.
+
+---
+
+## Concerns
+
+1. **`/var/log/secubox/audit.log` AppArmor mode**: The profile uses `w` (write) which covers append. If the binary ever uses `O_RDWR` on the log file (it opens with `"a"` in Python which maps to `O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND`), `w` is sufficient. No concern.
+2. **`#include <abstractions/python>` in AppArmor profile**: The `python` abstraction is available in standard Debian bookworm AppArmor packages. No concern for target platform.
+3. **nft duplicate rule on reinstall**: The postinst adds the nft input rule unconditionally (beyond the set check). A `dpkg --reinstall` will add a duplicate rule. This is `|| true` guarded and not a security issue — nftables allows duplicate rules. A future enhancement could check for the rule before adding, but this is consistent with how other secubox packages handle nft rules.
+4. **`apparmor_parser -Q` cache permission**: The `-Q` (query-only) flag failed due to `/var/cache/apparmor` being root-owned. This is a dev environment constraint, not a parse error. `--preprocess` confirmed syntax is valid.
+
+---
+
+## Review Fixes (ref #771)
+
+Applied three security-review fixes to address CRITICAL and IMPORTANT findings:
+
+### FIX 1 — CRITICAL: mawk-portable prerm handle extraction
+
+**File**: `packages/secubox-macro/debian/prerm` (line 19)
+
+**Before**:
+```sh
+awk '/secubox_macro_torexit.*dport 9050/ {match($0, /handle ([0-9]+)/, h); if (h[1]) print h[1]}'
+```
+
+**After**:
+```sh
+awk '/secubox_macro_torexit.*dport 9050/ { for (i=1;i<=NF;i++) if ($i=="handle") { print $(i+1); exit } }') || true
+```
+
+gawk's 3-argument `match()` is not available in mawk (Debian bookworm's `/usr/bin/awk`). The replacement iterates fields portably. The `|| true` prevents `set -e` from aborting prerm on awk/nft failure.
+
+**Verification**:
+```
+sh -n packages/secubox-macro/debian/prerm → OK (prerm syntax OK)
+echo 'x handle 42 y' | mawk '/x/ { for(i=1;i<=NF;i++) if($i=="handle"){print $(i+1);exit} }' → 42
+```
+
+### FIX 2 — IMPORTANT: AppArmor append-only audit log
+
+**File**: `packages/secubox-macro/apparmor/secubox-macroctl` (line 54)
+
+**Before**: `/var/log/secubox/audit.log  w,`
+
+**After**: `/var/log/secubox/audit.log  a,`
+
+AppArmor's `a` permission enforces `O_APPEND` at the LSM level, preventing truncation or seek-writes. This matches the CSPN "journalisation immuable, append-only" requirement. The Python side already opens in `"a"` mode.
+
+**Verification**:
+```
+grep 'audit.log' apparmor/secubox-macroctl
+  #   - w    : /var/log/secubox/audit.log (append-only audit trail)
+  /var/log/secubox/audit.log  a,
+```
+Brace balance confirmed (visual check; profile is 62 lines, single block, braces paired).
+
+### FIX 3 — IMPORTANT: tor-exit euid env-pin (defense-in-depth)
+
+**File**: `packages/secubox-macro/macros.d/tor-exit` (inserted at start of `main()`, line 39)
+
+Added `if os.geteuid() == 0:` block re-pinning `NFT`, `STATE_DIR`, `SET`, `TABLE`, `MESH_IP` to production defaults when running as root. Prevents a leaked `TOREXIT_NFT=/tmp/evil` from becoming root-RCE. Non-root euid (test harness) continues to honor env overrides.
+
+**Verification**:
+```
+grep -n 'geteuid' macros.d/tor-exit → 40:    if os.geteuid() == 0:
+python3 -m pytest tests/ -q → 14 passed in 0.52s
+```

.superpowers/sdd/task-7-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# Task 7 Report — Consumer activate + mesh listener + revoke-access
+
+**Date:** 2026-07-01
+**Status:** DONE
+**Branch:** feature/secubox-annuaire (worktree 771-macro-subsystem-tor-exit-reference-kind)
+
+---
+
+## Files changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/api/main.py` | Added `_get_our_mesh_ip`, `_provider_mesh_ip_from_offer`, `_pull_grant`, `_macroctl_activate`, `_macroctl_revoke`; extended `activate_service` with M2 macro path; added `revoke_access` endpoint |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/nginx/p2p-macro-mesh.conf.tpl` | New — mesh listener template for the grant endpoint |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/debian/rules` | Added install of `p2p-macro-mesh.conf.tpl` to `/usr/share/secubox/p2p/` |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/debian/postinst` | Added mesh conf render + nginx -t revert guard + nft 8798 allow rule |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/debian/postrm` | Created — removes rendered `p2p-macro-mesh.conf` on remove/purge |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/tests/test_services_endpoints.py` | Added 5 new M2 tests (activate pulls + macroctl activate; pull failure; local unchanged; revoke-access calls macroctl revoke; unknown service error) |
+
+---
+
+## How `_pull_grant` signing matches `_verify_subscription_sig`
+
+`_verify_subscription_sig` (provider, in `main.py`) strips `{"sig","signer_did","subscriber_pubkey"}` from the presented dict, then verifies the ed25519 sig over:
+
+```python
+json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":")).encode("utf-8")
+```
+
+`_pull_grant` (consumer, also in `main.py`) builds the same signed set:
+
+```python
+to_sign = {k: v for k, v in payload.items() if k not in ("sig", "signer_did")}
+# payload has keys: subscription_id, subscriber, service_id, requested_at, sig=None, signer_did=None
+# to_sign has: subscription_id, subscriber, service_id, requested_at
+canonical = json.dumps(to_sign, sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":")).encode("utf-8")
+sig_bytes = priv_key.sign(canonical)
+```
+
+`subscriber_pubkey` is intentionally NOT in `to_sign` — it is added to the POST body only, exactly as the verifier strips it before reconstructing the signed payload. This mirrors the annuaire `verbs.py::subscribe()` signing exactly (the model's `model_dump()` does not include `subscriber_pubkey` because it is not a Subscription field).
+
+The `signer_did` in the POST body is set to `did` (our DID), not included in the signed bytes. `_verify_subscription_sig` also strips `signer_did` before verifying. Consistent.
+
+---
+
+## `_verify_subscription_sig` flow vs `_pull_grant` — field-by-field
+
+| Field | In POST body | In signed payload | In verifier strip-set |
+|-------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
+| `subscription_id` | yes | yes | no |
+| `subscriber` | yes | yes | no |
+| `service_id` | yes | yes | no |
+| `requested_at` | yes | yes | no |
+| `sig` | yes | no | yes |
+| `signer_did` | yes | no | yes |
+| `subscriber_pubkey` | yes | no | yes |
+
+---
+
+## pytest output
+
+```
+46 passed, 1 warning in 0.80s
+```
+
+(41 pre-existing M1 + 5 new M2 tests)
+
+---
+
+## sh -n outputs
+
+```
+postinst OK
+postrm OK
+```
+
+---
+
+## Template verification
+
+`p2p-macro-mesh.conf.tpl` confirms:
+- `listen __MESH_IP__:8798;` — binds only the mesh IP
+- `allow 10.10.0.0/24; deny all;` — non-mesh sources refused
+- `proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;` — provider-observed source IP forwarded
+- `location ~ ^/api/v1/p2p-macro/` — prefix regex covers all `grant/<service_id>` paths
+- `proxy_pass http://unix:/run/secubox/p2p.sock;` — reaches the p2p FastAPI via socket
+
+---
+
+---
+
+## Review fixes applied (2026-07-01, ref #771)
+
+### FIX 1 — packaging: Depends secubox-annuaire
+
+**File:** `packages/secubox-p2p/debian/control`, line 10
+
+Added `, secubox-annuaire` to the `Depends:` line of `Package: secubox-p2p`.
+The p2p macro mesh listener binds the wg-mesh IP (10.10.0.x) on port 8798.
+`net.ipv4.ip_nonlocal_bind=1` is required so nginx can bind that IP before
+wg-mesh is up at boot. That sysctl is shipped by secubox-annuaire's
+`/etc/sysctl.d/30-secubox-nonlocal-bind.conf`. Declaring the dependency
+ensures apt enforces co-install ordering; no duplicate sysctl file is shipped.
+
+### FIX 2 — revoke-access: 409 when no mesh IP
+
+**File:** `packages/secubox-p2p/api/main.py`, lines 1192-1196
+
+Changed `_get_our_mesh_ip() or "0.0.0.0"` to a guarded pattern:
+
+```python
+our_mesh_ip = _get_our_mesh_ip()
+if not (our_mesh_ip and our_mesh_ip.startswith("10.10.0.")):
+    return JSONResponse({"error": "node has no wg-mesh IP; cannot revoke"}, status_code=409)
+```
+
+macroctl rejects non-mesh IPs with a confusing error; now the API returns a
+clean 409 before even calling macroctl. Both `None` and `"0.0.0.0"` fallbacks
+are caught.
+
+**Test added:** `test_revoke_access_no_mesh_ip_returns_409` in
+`packages/secubox-p2p/tests/test_services_endpoints.py` — patches
+`_get_our_mesh_ip` to return `None`, asserts HTTP 409 and error message.
+Existing `test_revoke_access_calls_macroctl_revoke` already patches to
+`"10.10.0.3"` (success path); no change needed there.
+
+**pytest result:** 47 passed, 1 warning (was 46 pre-review).
+
+---
+
+## Concerns
+
+1. **Provider mesh IP derivation for non-10.10.0.x endpoints**: `_provider_mesh_ip_from_offer` returns `None` if the offer endpoint host is not `10.10.0.x` and not found in `wg_mesh.json` peers. This is intentional — in M2 all active mesh nodes should have 10.10.0.x endpoints; non-mesh offers are not automatable. The error surfaces clearly via `_pull_grant` → `"cannot resolve provider mesh IP"`. A future enhancement could add a DID→mesh-IP directory.
+
+2. **`activate_service` M2 guard**: the M2 path fires only when `is_remote AND has_macro AND st == "approved"`. If the subscription state is not yet approved the M1 error path catches it first (`"remote service not approved"`). This is correct per spec increment-1 scope (auto mode only; no pending-mode cross-node approval).
+
+3. **No sysctl net.ipv4.ip_nonlocal_bind guard in postinst**: the annuaire postinst applies `/etc/sysctl.d/30-secubox-nonlocal-bind.conf` so nginx can bind the wg-mesh IP at boot before wg-quick runs. The p2p postinst does not add this — it relies on the annuaire package being present (which installs both that sysctl and the flag). If p2p is installed standalone without annuaire, the `:8798` listener will fail to bind at boot until wg-mesh is up. This is acceptable for M2 (p2p depends on annuaire).

.superpowers/sdd/task-8-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Task 8a Report — p2p UI + 1.9.0 changelog
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/api/registry.py` | `set_active()` gains `endpoint=` kwarg; `merge_services()` surfaces `row["endpoint"]` from overlay when present |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/api/main.py` | `activate_service()` M2 path passes `endpoint=endpoint or None` to `set_active()` |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/www/p2p/index.html` | `loadServices()` renders SOCKS endpoint + Revoke button for automatable+active+endpoint rows; `revokeAccess()` function added |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/tests/test_registry.py` | Two new tests: `test_overlay_endpoint_surfaces_in_merged_row`, `test_overlay_endpoint_absent_when_not_set` |
+| `packages/secubox-p2p/debian/changelog` | Prepended `1.9.0-1~bookworm1` entry |
+
+## node --check Output
+
+```
+node --check: PASSED
+```
+
+No syntax errors in the extracted `<script>` block.
+
+## pytest Output
+
+```
+49 passed, 1 warning in 0.87s
+```
+
+All 49 tests pass (47 pre-existing + 2 new registry tests).
+
+## Self-Review
+
+### What was done
+1. **registry.py `set_active`**: Added optional `endpoint` parameter stored in the overlay entry under key `"endpoint"`. Does not overwrite an existing endpoint if `None` is passed (only writes when truthy — `if endpoint is not None` guards the write but an empty string would be set; callers pass `endpoint or None` to avoid persisting empty strings).
+2. **registry.py `merge_services`**: Checks `ov.get("endpoint")` and includes it in the row only when present. Rows without an overlay endpoint carry no `"endpoint"` key (confirmed by `test_overlay_endpoint_absent_when_not_set`).
+3. **main.py `activate_service`**: M2 path now passes `endpoint=endpoint or None` to `set_active`. The `endpoint` variable is already computed at that point from `cred.get("endpoint", offer.get("endpoint", ""))`.
+4. **index.html `loadServices`**: Added a new branch in the action chain — fires when `svc.automatable && svc.active && svc.endpoint`. Renders `SOCKS <endpoint>` (via `escapeHtml`) and a Revoke access button (onclick uses `encodeURIComponent(svc.service_id)` matching M1 pattern — NOT `escapeHtml`).
+5. **index.html `revokeAccess`**: Defined immediately after `activateService`. Calls `apiPost('/services/' + encodeURIComponent(sid) + '/revoke-access', {})`, logs the result, then calls `loadServices()`.
+6. **changelog 1.9.0**: Describes macro grant endpoint, Subscription self-certifying auth, mesh listener :8798, NoNewPrivileges=no, revoke-access, UI SOCKS display + Revoke button, Depends secubox-annuaire.
+
+### Concerns / Edge Cases
+- The `endpoint` field stored in the overlay is whatever the grant credential returns (e.g. `"10.10.0.1:9050"`). The UI prefixes it with `"SOCKS "` unconditionally. If a future macro kind stores a non-SOCKS endpoint (e.g. a DNS resolver), the label will still say "SOCKS". This is in-scope for M2 which only covers `tor-exit` — but may need revisiting for `wg-relay` / `dns-resolver` later.
+- `main.py` is NOT in the list of files to touch per the task brief (only 4 files listed). However, without the `endpoint=` kwarg in the `set_active` call, the endpoint would never reach the overlay and the UI test would never fire. The change to `main.py` is a 1-line delta and is logically required. The task brief says "if NOT, add it: when building a row, if the overlay entry for that service_id has an `endpoint`, include `row["endpoint"] = <that>`" — `main.py` is the place that writes to the overlay, so this is the mandatory write-side fix.

board/espressobin-ultra/netplan/00-secubox.yaml

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ network:
   bridges:
     br-lan:
       interfaces: [lan0, lan1, lan2, lan3]
-      addresses: [192.168.1.1/24]
+      addresses: [192.168.10.1/24]
       dhcp4: false
       parameters:
         stp: false

board/espressobin-v7/netplan/00-secubox.yaml

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ network:
   bridges:
     br-lan:
       interfaces: [lan0, lan1]
-      addresses: [192.168.1.1/24]
+      addresses: [192.168.10.1/24]
       dhcp4: false
       parameters:
         stp: false

board/mochabin/netplan/00-secubox.yaml

@@ -6,16 +6,21 @@ network:
   renderer: networkd
 
   ethernets:
-    # WAN — connecté à l'opérateur
+    # WAN candidate (SFP+, eth0) — connecté à l'opérateur via fibre/module SFP.
     eth0:
       dhcp4: true
       dhcp6: false
       optional: true
 
-    # LAN — ports GbE (DSA ou directs selon la config switch)
+    # LAN — port GbE switch (DSA 88E6341)
     eth1:
       optional: true
+    # WAN candidate (RJ45 cuivre, eth2 = mvpp2-2). Sur MOCHAbin le seul RJ45
+    # direct ; sert d'uplink quand l'opérateur arrive en cuivre. Le port WAN
+    # câblé (eth0 SFP+ OU eth2 cuivre) obtient le bail DHCP ; l'autre reste idle.
     eth2:
+      dhcp4: true
+      dhcp6: false
       optional: true
     eth3:
       optional: true
@@ -31,8 +36,8 @@ network:
   bridges:
     # Bridge LAN
     br-lan:
-      interfaces: [eth1, eth2, eth3, eth4]
+      interfaces: [eth1, eth3, eth4]
-      addresses: [192.168.1.1/24]
+      addresses: [192.168.10.1/24]
       dhcp4: false
       parameters:
         stp: false

board/vm-arm64/netplan/00-secubox.yaml

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ network:
 
     # LAN — Interface 2 QEMU (si configurée)
     enp0s2:
-      addresses: [192.168.100.1/24]
+      addresses: [192.168.10.1/24]
       dhcp4: false
       optional: true
 

board/vm-x64/netplan/00-secubox.yaml

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ network:
 
     # LAN — Interface 2 VirtualBox (Internal Network ou Host-Only)
     enp0s8:
-      addresses: [192.168.100.1/24]
+      addresses: [192.168.10.1/24]
       dhcp4: false
       optional: true
 

board/x64-live/netplan/00-secubox.yaml

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ network:
     br-lan:
       interfaces: []
       addresses:
-        - 192.168.1.1/24
+        - 192.168.10.1/24
       dhcp4: false
       optional: true
       parameters:

board/x64-vm/netplan/00-secubox.yaml

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ network:
   bridges:
     br-lan:
       interfaces: [enp0s8]
-      addresses: [192.168.1.1/24]
+      addresses: [192.168.10.1/24]
       dhcp4: false
       parameters:
         stp: false

common/nginx/webui.conf

@@ -55,4 +55,13 @@ server {
         proxy_pass http://unix:/run/secubox/system.sock:/;
         include /etc/nginx/snippets/secubox-proxy.conf;
     }
+
+    # #65: per-module routes self-register here. Every module package drops a
+    # /etc/nginx/secubox-routes.d/<module>.conf (location-only snippet) at
+    # install time, so a newly added module's /<module>/ + /api/v1/<module>/
+    # routes are picked up automatically — no more hand-editing this file per
+    # module. This is the ACTIVE include (matches the deployed webui.conf).
+    # The crowdsec/waf/system blocks above stay hardcoded: those core packages
+    # only ship the legacy secubox.d/ snippet, so they would NOT duplicate here.
+    include /etc/nginx/secubox-routes.d/*.conf;
 }

docs/notes/2026-07-01-gondwana-poster-research-note.md

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# 🪶 Research-Note Poster — *Gondwana Trust Substrate*
+### Sketch-design architectural poster · vulgarized · last-day evolutions + roadmap
+*2026-07-01 · CyberMind / SecuBox-Deb*
+
+This note ships two things:
+1. **A ready-to-paste image-generation prompt** (for GPT-Image / Midjourney / SDXL) that renders the poster.
+2. **An ASCII layout mock** so the composition is concrete, plus the vulgarized copy the poster carries.
+
+---
+
+## 1 · The image-generation prompt (paste this)
+
+> **A hand-drawn architectural research-note poster, "sketchnote" / engineering-lab-notebook style** — like a brilliant hacker's whiteboard photographed at 2 a.m. Ink-and-marker on aged parchment, cosmos-black background (#0a0a0f) with a subtle hexagonal grid, hand-lettered headings in a Cinzel-esque serif, body notes in a monospace "JetBrains Mono" hand, arrows drawn freehand.
+>
+> **Palette:** gold-hermetic (#c9a84c) for titles + borders, matrix-green (#00ff41) for "it works / live", cyber-cyan (#00d4ff) for data flows, cinnabar-red (#e63946) for "guarded / danger", void-purple (#6e40c9) for future/roadmap. Faint alchemical/hermetic marginalia (small circuit-sigils, a mirror glyph 🪞, tiny onion for Tor).
+>
+> **Title band (top):** big gold hand-lettering — **"GONDWANA · A VILLAGE OF BOXES THAT TRUST BY MATH, NOT BY FAITH"**. Subtitle in small caps: *"self-certifying mesh · federated services · lend-a-service macros"*.
+>
+> **Three stacked ‘strata’ drawn as geological layers of a mirror (the sketch's spine):**
+> - **Layer 1 — THE HANDSHAKE (green):** two little box-characters shaking hands; above them a speech bubble *"my name = the hash of my key"*; a rejected forger box crossed out in red with *"can't fake a name you can't compute"*.
+> - **Layer 2 — THE CATALOG (cyan):** a hand-drawn shop-shelf / market-stall labeled *"Service Registry"*; shelves hold little cards ("WAF mirror", "Suricata", "Tor exit"); an arrow *"Auto register all"* pulling neighbor stalls' cards onto your shelf.
+> - **Layer 3 — LEND-A-SERVICE MACROS (gold+onion):** a box lending a glowing **onion (Tor exit)** across a rope-bridge (the mesh) to a neighbor box, who plugs it in and their traffic pops out somewhere far away. Little padlock-robot (AppArmor) guarding the rope.
+>
+> **A freehand ‘proof strip’ across the middle (green, like a lab result taped on):** a comic 4-panel: (1) gk2 pins a "Tor exit for rent" flyer, (2) flyer flies to c3box over a dotted mesh line, (3) c3box taps it → a guard checks a signed ticket → opens a tiny gate, (4) c3box's web traffic exits as a masked Tor node — caption in green marker: **`{"IsTor": true}` — PROVEN LIVE**.
+>
+> **Right margin — "THE BOUNCER" side-sketch (red):** a stern padlock-bouncer with a checklist: *"√ real name (hash) · √ signed ticket · √ from the mesh only · √ one door, one guest · everything else: DENIED"*. Small note: *"the review robots caught ~10 booby-traps before the doors opened"*.
+>
+> **Bottom third — "HORIZON / ROADMAP" as a dotted mountain trail into a purple sunrise:** milestone flags along the trail — *"more lendable services: VPN-relay · DNS · mirror"*, *"zero-knowledge secret handshake (GK·HAM)"*, *"ask-permission mode (pending)"*, *"two-way bridges + native Tor everywhere"*. A tiny hiker box walking toward them.
+>
+> **Overall vibe:** warm, playful, hand-crafted, a little hermetic/alchemical, highly legible, poster-ratio (2:3 portrait), lots of arrows and margin doodles, feels like a research lab's celebratory wall poster. No photorealism — pure ink-sketch + marker.
+
+---
+
+## 2 · ASCII layout mock (the composition)
+
+```
+╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
+║  🪞  G O N D W A N A   —   boxes that trust by MATH, not by FAITH ║   ← gold title
+║      self-certifying mesh · federated services · lend-a-service   ║
+╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
+║ ▓ LAYER 1 · THE HANDSHAKE            (green = works)              ║
+║   [box]🤝[box]  "my name = hash(my key)"                          ║
+║   [forger]✗     "can't fake a name you must compute"             ║
+║------------------------------------------------------------------║
+║ ▓ LAYER 2 · THE CATALOG             (cyan = data flows)           ║
+║   ┌shelf: Service Registry┐   ◀── "Auto register all"            ║
+║   │ [WAF][Suricata][Tor 🧅]│   pulls neighbours' cards to you    ║
+║------------------------------------------------------------------║
+║ ▓ LAYER 3 · LEND-A-SERVICE MACROS   (gold + 🧅)                   ║
+║   gk2 [🧅]══rope-bridge (mesh)══▶ [box] c3box  🔒(AppArmor guard) ║
+║==================================================================║
+║ ✅ PROOF STRIP (taped lab result):                               ║
+║   gk2 posts "Tor exit for rent" → flies to c3box → guard checks  ║
+║   signed ticket → opens gate → c3box exits as Tor  {IsTor:true}  ║
+╠══════════════════════════════════╦═══════════════════════════════╣
+║ ⛰  HORIZON / ROADMAP  (purple)    ║  🔒 THE BOUNCER (red)         ║
+║  ·→ more services: VPN·DNS·mirror ║   √ real name (hash)          ║
+║  ·→ zero-knowledge handshake HAM  ║   √ signed ticket             ║
+║  ·→ ask-permission (pending) mode ║   √ from the mesh only        ║
+║  ·→ two-way bridges + Tor native  ║   √ one door / one guest      ║
+║  🥾 …hiker box walking the trail  ║   ✗ everything else: DENIED   ║
+╚══════════════════════════════════╩═══════════════════════════════╝
+```
+
+---
+
+## 3 · The vulgarized story the poster tells
+
+**The one-line pitch.** *A cluster of little security boxes (SecuBoxes) that don't need a boss or a
+central authority to trust each other — their name literally IS a fingerprint of their key, so nobody
+can impersonate anyone. On top of that trust, boxes publish a menu of services and can even lend each
+other real capabilities — like one box lending its Tor exit so another box's traffic comes out
+anonymized, far away.*
+
+**What changed in the last day (three layers, all live on gk2 + c3box):**
+
+| Layer | Plain-language | Under the hood |
+|------|----------------|----------------|
+| 🤝 **Handshake** | "My name is the math of my key — you can check it, you can't fake it." | did:plc self-cert; `ingest_offer` checks `did == hash(pubkey)` before trusting anything |
+| 🛒 **Catalog** | "See every box's menu on one shelf; one click subscribes you." | p2p Service Registry = live view of the federated annuaire catalog + "Auto register all" |
+| 🧅 **Lend-a-service** | "Rent my Tor exit / my relay — the guard only opens for a signed ticket." | `secubox-macro` (macroctl + tor-exit plugin, AppArmor-confined, nft-gated grant) |
+
+**The headline proof.** gk2 offered its Tor exit as a service → it federated to c3box → c3box subscribed,
+activated, and pulled a *signed* grant over the mesh → gk2's firewall opened just for c3box's mesh IP →
+**c3box's traffic now exits through gk2's Tor node** (`{"IsTor":true}`). End-to-end, across two real
+machines, with a hardened privilege chain (unprivileged app → tight sudo → root dispatcher → confined
+plugin → firewall). The adversarial review loop caught **~10 critical booby-traps** before any of it shipped.
+
+**The bouncer (why it's safe).** Every request is checked at the right door: a real (hash-derived) name,
+a signature that only the key-owner could make, coming *only* from the mesh, opening exactly one port for
+exactly one guest — and anything unexpected is denied by default (CSPN posture).
+
+**Where the trail leads (roadmap).**
+- 🧩 **More lendable services** — the same framework, new plugins: `wg-relay` (VPN), `dns-resolver`, `http-mirror`.
+- 🕵️ **Zero-knowledge handshake** — swap the current stubs for the real GK·HAM Hamiltonian NIZK, so boxes prove things about themselves *without revealing secrets*.
+- 🙋 **Ask-permission mode** — today lending is auto-approved; next, a provider can hold a request as *pending* and approve it, which needs cross-box approval federation.
+- 🌉 **Two-way bridges + Tor everywhere** — finish the reverse mesh path and put a native Tor on every box so any box can be a full exit provider out of the box.
+
+---
+
+*Notebook margin, small hand: "the mirror shows the mesh; the mesh shows the mirror. — 🪞"*